The paper reviews the East European vector in the U.S. foreign policy priorities during the period of end of the Cold War. In the new geopolitical conditions the place of Ukraine as one of the East European countries is examined. Since the end of the Cold War the East European vector of U.S. foreign policy has transformed: there were invented new principles and measures of American policy towards Eastern Europe; relations with the former socialist camp countries have moved from the field of US-Soviet to US-European relations; the main signs of «New» East European policy has extended to the former Soviet republics, including Ukraine. However, secondary importance and subordination to US-Russian relations remained as main feature of even «New» American East European policy. Example of this is U.S. policy towards independent Ukraine.

Keywords: foreign policy, international relations, the Cold War, the U.S., Ukraine.

The events of the Cold War and the almost 50 years of confrontation between the superpowers and their satellites – have been and will remain under the cross-attention of historians, political scientists and social scientists. The scientific interest towards outlined issues seems to be exacerbated not only by the interest in the recent past in which many personalities were active participants and “creators” of those events, but primarily by the fact that the Cold War’s echo still has a great impact on the role and place of the countries on the international arena. Due to the fact that after the Cold War Ukraine got its possibility to conduct an independent foreign policy and became the part of the Eastern Europe, Ukraine’s position among
the U.S. foreign policy priorities is still an issue of current importance.

Various aspects of the U.S. East-European policy, the role of Ukraine among U.S. foreign policy priorities, history of international relations during the Cold War era and after its end – are adequately reflected in domestic and foreign historiography, political and even philological research.

It is natural that Ukrainian scholars are more interested in Ukraine-focused issues. The purpose of this publication is to analyze the East-European vector of U.S. foreign policy priorities at the end of the Cold War and to determine Ukraine’s place in new geopolitical conditions as now it belongs to the Eastern Europe.

Before going directly to the description of the basic ideas of this publication, we have to decide on the term “Eastern Europe”, which is one of the debatable in the history of international relations. This term was originally a geographical one, which itself meant the Eastern part of the European continent but it had no certain “list of states”, which were included into that region and recognized by the researchers.

In this article the term “Eastern Europe” is taken in the political interpretation of the Cold War times when the Eastern European countries were a set of states of so-called socialist camp. Their international status was determined by their stay in the fairway policy of the USSR.

It should be mentioned that during the Cold War in the documents and in public speeches of representatives of the American government such terms as “Eastern Europe”, “Central and Eastern Europe”, “Central and Eastern Europe” were used equally towards these countries. After the end of the bipolar confrontation the overwhelming majority of the former socialist states integrated into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, so in political terms the “Eastern Europe” has changed dramatically. Former Soviet republics, including Ukraine became the new East-European countries.

Throughout the twentieth century, the countries of the Eastern part of the European continent were on the periphery of American foreign policy interests. The history of U.S. involvement into European affairs actually begins at the mentioned century, with the refusal from the so-called policy of isolationism. If you try to allocate a certain vector of East-European American foreign policy, it can be seen only from mid-twentieth century. In the first half of the twentieth century since the intensification of the U.S. European policy until the end of World War II East-European countries were considered in the overall European context and did not constitute a separate interest to the United States. After the war, the place of the Eastern Europe had changed among the regional directions of U.S. foreign policy. With the design of the new system of the military-political blocs and the world’s split into two camps, the Eastern Europe took a separate, although a secondary place among the U.S. foreign policy priorities. The Cold War’s peculiarity was the subordination of the American East-European politics towards US-Soviet relations in the context of anti-Soviet policy. This period is already fundamentally analyzed in both foreign and domestic historiography of the Soviet and post-Soviet period, so we will not dwell on it. It might be noted that the emphasis of the characteristics of the American East-European policy of the second half of the twentieth century was usually determined by the historian’s belonging either to the Eastern or Western bloc.

The brightest period in the history of U.S. East-European politics can be named during the democratic anti-totalitarian revolutions in 1989. At that time, though it was a short period, Eastern Europe took the first place among the foreign policy interests. Let’s consider it more thoroughly.

First of all we have to make a brief overview of the geopolitical situation, which occurred as the background of changes in the American East-European politics. The beginning of the transformation of socio-political and economic life in the socialist countries in 1989 led to the radical changes in the entire system of international relations that arose after World War II. The necessity of the adequate response to the events in the region had put before the U.S. a number of problems solution of which was strategically important, because the role and place of the United States was changing together with the transformation of the world.

The formulation of new tasks and goals of American East-European policy in regard to new historical context was put into agenda. The improving of the US-Soviet relations resulted largely restrained, cautious nature of the reaction of U.S. towards those revolutionary changes that took place in the region. The priority of relations with the USSR remained a major factor in American foreign policy: that is why the effects of any U.S. actions in Eastern Europe first of all were considered largely by their impact on US-Soviet relations.

With the extension of economic and political liberalization of the East-European countries and So-
Soviet laissez-faire in these processes the likelihood of so-called “geopolitical vacuum” in Eastern Europe became evident. This might have caused rivalry between Western Europe and the U.S. which were trying to take the place of the USSR. For the United States the situation was complicated by the intensification of the West-European integration process. With the exclusion of East-European countries from the sphere of Soviet influence conditions were created in order to attract them to join this process. It constituted a real threat to the future of U.S. presence on the continent, which earlier was based on the need to confront the Soviet Union and to ensure the security and stability in Europe. Therefore, one of the defining needs of American policy had become the invention of potential confrontation or conflict situations for solving of which the USA were needed.

The best reason for this was the situation in Europe regarding the issue of German unification. On the one hand, the realization of this idea might allow creation of a new political and economic center. That might attract other European countries and make unnecessary U.S. military presence and their involvement into solving of European problems. But on the other hand, despite the intensive integration process leading Western European countries such as Britain and France did not agree with the fact that in Europe there would be a new force, although they perceived the inevitability of unification of the two Germanys. At the end of 1989 due to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the proclamation of H. Kohl’s 10-items program on the reunification of Germany, for the United States there was a real opportunity to play a leading role in negotiations between Germany and victorious countries of World War II as intermediary. This had provided an active part of the United States in solving of one of the problematic issues of European security in late 1989-first half of 1990.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s another factor of international relations came on the foreground, which allowed the U.S. to maintain its involvement into the European affairs. This was the process of disarmament and control over different types of weapons, which was one of the cornerstones of that time international relations. At the last stage of the Cold war, namely during the second term of Reagan’s presidency the discussion of this issue positively contributed to the improving of US-Soviet relations and resulted in the closer contact between the superpowers. During the presidency of George H. W. Bush it had become one of the important aspects of American policy in Europe, which gave the Americans an opportunity and legitimate reasons to continue to occupy a leading role in addressing the topical issues related to the demilitarization of Europe. For example, in March 1989 the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker described Europe as the most heavily armed continent in the world. And in the Directive on National Security 23 on September 22, 1989 it was stated: “We will be vigilant, recognizing that the Soviet Union is still governed by authoritarian methods and that its powerful armed forces remain a threat to our security and that of our allies”.

At that time the issue of military presence in Europe, which had to be reduced, was important for the U.S. in the connection with the processes of disarmament and the disappearance of the communist threat. The NATO’s role decrease also influenced on the reduction of U.S. involvement in promoting stability on the continent, because it was connected with the revival of the integration process and the growing influence of Western European defense structures. Some European countries, and, paradoxically, the Soviet Union, were willing the American troops to remain for some time in Europe. That was dictated by the attempt to create a counterbalance to Germany. At that time this coincided with the interests of the United States, and was one of the legitimate basis for further U.S. military presence in Europe and engagement into the solving of some European issues. During the August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union the issue of arms control was one of those, on which the attention to the U.S. was focused while describing events in the USSR. When J. Baker described the removal of Mikhail Gorbachev from power as illegitimate, he emphasized that “we remain committed to an arms control process broadly defined for the simple fact that it is in the West’s interest, irrespective of who is in charge in Moscow”.

In general, the formation of new approaches of American East-European politics in 1989 – the first half of 1990 took place in difficult geopolitical conditions. The gradual reorientation of East-European “vector” of American policy from Soviet to the European context was present, although for some time it remained subordinated to the relations with the USSR. We also can notice the changing nature of U.S. relationships with Western states that had its expression in recognition of the NATO allies as equal partners, in declaring the intention of non-dominance in European and transatlantic organizations, in reducing the control of Western countries relations with Eastern Europe, awareness of the need to transfer the leadership in the region to EU countries. Thus, according to J. Baker:
“To work with our allies is not a sign of American weakness; it is a proof of our strength”8.

It should be noted that the general rhetoric of American foreign policy changed due to the transformation of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. During the Cold War its main components were “democracy” and “anti-communism”, which were manifested in the US-Soviet relations and U.S. policy towards Eastern Europe. Since 1989 the anticommunist rhetoric has finally disappeared, which has been caused by positive changes in relations between the superpowers. In addition, the secret diplomacy support of anti-communist opposition, which was formerly specific to the U.S. East-European policy, has changed to an open formal policy towards the opposition, which came to power.

A new rhetoric which can be defined in the original formula “democracy + reform” has come instead of anti-Communist slogans. So, after a long struggle against communism, the new U.S. mission in the world was characterized as “the protection and consolidation of democracy”, “democracy as a regional goal”, “new era of democracy” and reaching the democracy in all regions of the world was primarily associated with reforms9. And the process of transition of East European countries from a command economy and authoritarian political forms of government to a democratic system and market economy was regarded in this context: “The economic reforms and greater international security can give us the strength for the tough transitions that will transform the revolutions of 1989 into the democracies of the 1990s”10. It should be noted that similar statements were distributed not only for Eastern Europe, but also towards the Soviet Union, and after its collapse – to the former Soviet republic. Thus, immediately after the failure of the coup in August 1991, the basic principles on which the U.S. sought to keep relations with the USSR, were declared as following: continuation of reform, including decommunization, respect for human rights, and peaceful conciliation between the center and republics11. After defining the geopolitical context and the rhetoric of new approaches of the American East-European politics lets try to give general description of its practical realization. The exact specificity of 1989 was that the U.S. had to abandon the traditional policy towards Eastern Europe, which was carried out during the previous 40 years of the Cold War, and to transform the approaches that could be useful in the new historical conditions.

In summer and autumn of 1989 in both Houses of Congress and presidential administration there was an active discussion of the necessity to change U.S. policy towards Eastern Europe12. The development of the updated approaches towards East European countries was the result of it. Firstly, the financial assistance in the form of various support programs, which previously were untraditional for Eastern U.S. policy, was recognized as one of the main mechanisms for responding to changes in social and political life of the region. Secondly, it was recognized that the aid might be conditional: it was only available with continuing political and economic liberalization. Thirdly, initially (in June-August 1989) the caution was conditioned by the desire to prevent the deterioration of relations with the USSR and to provoke it to brake or even to stop the reform process in Eastern Europe, which was considered possible because of uncertainty of reaction of the USSR, which was determined by the internal problems in the Soviet Union. Fourthly, the new criteria for the so-called “policy of differentiation” were formed: previously it was “remoteness” from Moscow and protection of human rights, but new one had to be criterion for the success of economic reforms. That is, the differential approach from now on was largely based on domestic political and economic achievements of Eastern European countries.

In addition, we can define a certain evolution in setting the main goal of American policy towards Eastern Europe. With the political reforms in Poland and Hungary in the spring of 1989 the U.S. position can be characterized as wait-and attitude of an observer, and the main question was how to respond to these changes. In autumn 1989 the U.S. attitude to the transformation in Eastern Europe changed, and it can be characterized as active involvement in Eastern European events, because it has been conducted on how better to support the reform process in the region.

At the legislative level, the new U.S. East European policy was embodied in the “Support for East European Democracy Act” (SEED Act), which was adopted on November 28, 1989.

According to the SEED Act as a leader in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund U.S. assistance included activities such as following: supporting loans by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and its affiliated institutions in the World Bank group that are designed to modernize industry, agriculture, and infrastructure, and International Monetary Fund programs designed to stimulate sound economic growth; currency stabilization loans, country’s international debt reduction and rescheduling; agricultural assistance; grants to support private,
nonprofit “Enterprise Funds”, which undertake loans, grants, equity investments, feasibility studies, technical assistance, training, and other forms of assistance to private enterprise activities; technical assistance programs directed at promoting labor market reforms and facilitating economic adjustment; programs to provide technical skills to assist in the development of a market economy; establishment of Peace Corps programs; support for the establishment of indigenous credit unions; eligibility for trade benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences; the granting of temporary or permanent nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of an East European country through the application of the criteria and procedures established by section 2432 of title 19 (commonly referred to as the “Jackson-Vanik amendment”); programs of the Export-Import Bank of the United States; assistance in Trade and Development Program activities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and in negotiation of bilateral investment treaties; expanded exchange activities under the Fulbright, International Visitors, and other programs conducted by the United States Information Agency; establishment of sister institution programs between American and East European schools and universities, towns and cities, and other organizations in such fields as medicine and health care, business management, environmental protection, and agriculture; scholarships to enable students to study in the United States; grants for the implementation of bilateral agreements providing for cooperation in science and technology exchange; assistance designed to support the development of legal, legislative, electoral, journalistic and other institutions of free, pluralist societies; medical and environmental assistance etc.13.

All of these programs and the law itself initially concerned only Poland and Hungary. After the session of Congress the revolutionary changes in other Eastern European countries occurred, and in the first half of 1990 it was necessary to amend the existing “Support for East European Democracy Act” by providing the additional appropriates for other countries14.

As it had already been pointed out, first assistance programs were focused on financial and other forms of help for Poland and Hungary. It is concerned not only the U.S. assistance, but also of various international associations and organizations. Thus, a large sum of money amounting to 14 billion dollars had been allocated in 1989-1990 to support the investment credits for Poland and Hungary by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development15, in the fall of 1991 this amount grew to 45 billion – but for other countries Eastern Europe, including Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and East Germany16. The “conditional” approach towards the East Europe remained as a main feature for economic and financial assistance, which was given only in case of continued democratization and economic market reforms.

Thus, in the review, made by Secretary of State James Baker, that was published in the official U.S. State Department Dispatch on September 3, 1990 and was dedicated to the assistance reforms in Eastern Europe and Central America, five basic criteria, under which East European countries could expect the appropriate amounts and forms of assistance for basic political and economic reform, were identified: adherence to the rule of law; respect for human rights; introduction of multi-party systems; the holding of fair and free elections; and the development of market-oriented economies17. The same can be noticed about the principle of differentiation. The more radical changes took place in mentioned countries the greater volume of assistance could be expected.

Thus new U.S. East European policy was formed as financing of a number of programs, which first amount totaled $ 300 million was aimed on the development of the Enterprise Funds18. Soon funding was expanded to include five additional funds. One should recall the gradual abolishment of the Jackson-Vanik amendment for Eastern Europe19, and on policies to promote the entry of East European countries into Euro-Atlantic and other international structures.

But, in general, the major transformation took place – and all forms of relations between the U.S. and the former Eastern bloc started to go beyond the Soviet-American relations.

The attempt of the 1991 August coup in the USSR was a critical event in the history of the new U.S. East European policy and the Soviet-American relations.

As it is known events of 1989 in Eastern Europe and 1991 August events in the Soviet Union - were expected, but still surprising for the world community. Only now while having almost all facts, we know how the people’s revolutions in Eastern Europe and attempt of the conservative coup in the Soviet Union ended. Mentioned events and their consequences have already been evaluated in the published memoirs of the participants of events, comments and researchers’ generalizations. However, at a time when events were unfolded it was very difficult to predict how they would develop.
Before the coup G. Bush-senior supported the Soviet leader’s efforts to reform the USSR. His August visit to Ukraine in 1991 and the famous speech against separatism – “freedom is not the same as independence” was more likely proof of support for Gorbachev and his attempts to reform the Soviet Union. So, on August 1, 1991 the U.S. president supported his vision for the Union in the updated form: the republic will combine greater autonomy with a more active voluntary interaction – rather than pursuing the hopeless course of isolation. The speech, for which the American president was criticized for and later dubbed the “Chicken Kiev speech” by commentator William Safire, in fact was a reflection of the U.S. position towards relations between the center and the Soviet republics at the beginning of August 1991.

Attitudes toward the August 1991 putsch in the Soviet Union was the same as the reaction on the revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989: the U.S. position could be characterized as “wait and see”. The following key issues were discussed and commented on the situation in the USSR: the uncertainty of what would be the end of the events in the USSR; would it lead to the collapse of the reform process and the failure of international commitments; further fate of the East European countries. Although the coup in the Soviet Union was qualified as illegal and unconstitutional, and it was stated that “There will not be normal relations with the United States as long as this illegal coup remains in effect”, however, publically position was formulated as: “what we do is simply watch the situation unfold”.

After the defeat of a failed coup in Moscow, the U.S. almost immediately recognized the independence of the Baltic republics, and at a press conference on the matter on September 2, 1991 U.S. president welcomed “President Gorbachev’s support for the concept that the republics will be free to determine their own future”. However, the question of recognition of the proclaimed on 24 August, 1991 of independence of Ukraine and other Soviet republics was not discussed and not even mentioned.

Immediately after Estonia’s, Latvia’s and Lithuania’s independence had been recognized and diplomatic relations with them had been established, the U.S. policy towards them began to be modeled within the framework of the new East European policy. First of all that was the support of reforms, proposals of technical and other assistance, provision of most favored nation status in trade. It should be noted that due to the fact that the U.S. actually renewed diplomatic recognition of the Baltic republics, already done in 1920, most favored nation status in trade was just restored; it was given to these states in the 1925-1926.

In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania programs and forms of assistance were distributed, which were similar to those introduced in Eastern European countries since 1989: export of certain goods increased; visits of advisors and experts from the U.S. were organized to train in the field of law, justice, customs, commerce, investment; grants for exchange programs and training in the U.S. for regional private sector representatives, trade unions, local governments, mayors, educators (rectors and deans of law faculties, faculties of management and marketing), medical specialists, ecologists, specialists in telecommunications, tourism were provided; exchange programs for scholars and students, training programs, seminars were organized.

In addition, the Baltic republics were considered together with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and other Eastern European countries in the reviews of the U.S. State Department devoted to analysis of the U.S. aid and development of further transformation in the former socialist bloc.

The Baltic States immediately occupied a special place in the U.S. politics. So, in the “FREEDOM Support Act” 1992 (more details about it later – M.B.), which provided aid provision to the former Soviet republics, there were the particular conditions for Russia: it would not receive assistance provided for the mentioned law, if Russia delayed the process of withdrawal of the troops from the territory of the Baltic States or threatened their sovereignty.

With the official dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of newly independent states, as well as further integration of the former socialist countries of the Eastern Europe into the European community the concept of “Eastern Europe” gradually changed. More and more often former Eastern Europe figured as “Central and Eastern Europe” in official statements and documents of the U.S. legislative and executive authorities. A “new” Eastern Europe began to formalize on the geopolitical arena, to which former Soviet republics, including Ukraine were included. In the Russian political terminology the term “near abroad”28, emerged, and in the American concepts simultaneously appeared definitions of “Central and Eastern Europe”, “former Soviet Republics”, “newly independent states”.

However, whatever term we use in the early 1990s the U.S. policy towards Ukraine and other former So-
viet republics began to be realized in general outline of the new East European policy.

The first similar feature can be described as already mentioned cautious, prudent and wait attitude towards the proclaimed new independent states, except the Baltics. This was due to the fact that in 1991 the separation of republics from Russia, the core of the Soviet Union, as well as the separation of East European allies from the USSR in 1989, contained a great potential danger for Europe and international relations. In this regard statement made by Press Secretary M. Fitzwater on the President's Meeting with Chairman Leonid M. Kravchuk of the Supreme Rada of the Republic of the Ukraine in September 1991 is very remarkable. In the statement it was emphasized that the President reaffirmed to Chairman Kravchuk the administration’s firm support for the efforts underway in the Soviet Union to build democracy, market economic reform, and the rule of law. The President also outlined the U.S. steps to promote economic reform in Ukraine. The main issues, on which the meeting was focused, included a Peace Corps program and the provision of technical and medical assistance, increased trade with the U.S., and a visit of team of experts on this subject to Ukraine. Thus, we can conclude that the U.S. policy in September 1991 was still focused on relations with the Soviet Union as the holistic formation. That is why the recognition of the new independent states proclaimed in summer and establishing of diplomatic relations with them happened not at once.

On December 25, 1991 in the message to Americans on the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States on the ruins of the Soviet Union, George H.W. Bush congratulated new nations, and announced the U.S. recognition of their independence and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Russia and with Ukraine, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan, and noted the conditions under which the diplomatic relations would be established with other former Soviet republics. In this appeal as well as in other public statements made by the U.S. President, Russia’s future relations with the USA clearly appeared as particularly important, and that in fact Russia would take place of the USSR on the geopolitical arena and within the U.S. foreign policy priorities.

From that point the second feature begins that makes the U.S. policy towards independent Ukraine look like “East European” in the traditional sense – it is its secondary importance and subordination to the relations with Russia (USSR), which was typical for American policy towards Eastern Europe during the Cold War. This fact was repeatedly highlighted by the domestic and foreign researchers, so we will not stop on it in detail. Note only that Russia remained as the main priority for the U.S. on post-Soviet space. One example is the list of “regional topics” on the website of the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs of U.S. Department of State (April 2011), in which among post-Soviet countries only relations with Russia appeared.

As a third common feature we can name those principles that have been as a basis for U.S. bilateral relations with new states. The main slogans which were declared concerning Ukraine and other former Soviet republics lay in the context of the already mentioned formula “democracy + reform”.

The fourth feature can be considered a series of activities which began to be implemented through the “new” East European politics. Among them prior attention should be paid to the legislation. In the case of the “old” Eastern Europe “Support for East European Democracy Act” was passed (with riposte abbreviation in English – SEED Act). On October 24, 1992 a new law focused on “new” East European countries was passed, named as “Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets” – with another resounding abbreviation – FREEDON Act. Both legislations provided technical, financial assistance, investment promotion, and organization of educational and training programs, opening of Enterprise Funds with capital for business development loans.

As a result of 20 years funding of both legislations from 1989 to 2009 10 Enterprise Funds were established, covering by their activities in 18 countries: Poland and Hungary in 1990, Czechoslovakia (and later separately – the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and Bulgaria since 1991, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, Romania, the countries of Central Asia, Ukraine, Moldova since 1994, Russia and Albania in 1995.

For Ukraine Western NIS Enterprise Fund (WNISEF) was specially created, which was the first in Ukraine and Moldova regional equity fund with more than a decade of successful experience investing in small and medium business. Fund with an initial capital of 150 million dollars invested in 37 companies in the region, operating in different sectors, while focusing mainly on manufacturing, consumer goods, building materials, packaging, retail and financial services. WNISEF was established by Congress and funded by the U.S. government.
among similar measures that were inherent to U.S. policy toward the “old” and “new” Europe there were suggestions to abolish the famous Jackson-Vanik Amendment and to grant the most favorite nation’s status in the trade under certain conditions. In May 1989 President George H.W. Bush expressed his readiness to cooperate with Congress for a temporary waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, opening the way to extending most-favored-nation trade status to the Soviet Union in case if the Soviet Union codify its emigration laws in accord with international standards and implement new laws faithfully. This issue was mentioned in the National Security Directives no. 23 dated by September 22, 1989 and Directive no. 35 of January 24, 1990. Since December 1990 the American president had introduced the practice of temporary repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Soviet Union. For the first time it was made in December 1990, then in June 1991 expiration date of this decision was extended for another year. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the recognition of new states – a temporary repeal was spread to 12 republics – up to July 1993. However, the final abolition of the Jackson-Vanik amendment became an indicator of special “reward” for economic and political reforms and special attitude from the U.S. That fit into the framework of a new differential approach. Thus, the establishment of permanent normal trade relations and the formal abolition of the Jackson-Vanik amendment for Ukraine happened only after the Orange Revolution – in March 2006 during the presidency of George W. Bush-junior, although in all the formal attributes this could have happened much earlier. In general, from outside the main displays of the practical dimension of American policy towards Ukraine at end the Cold War and the beginning of independence looked like “East European”. However, you must pay attention to the existence of certain differences. Thus, in addition to the rhetoric in the spirit of “democracy + reform” in relation towards Ukraine security issues were very important. Before, during and after recognition of Ukrainian independence main slogans which were repeated to its address was about implementation of the desire to achieve a non-nuclear status, strengthening activity in the new state’s security policy and the maintenance of international agreements on reduction and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and other forms of weapons. Declared non-nuclear status of Ukraine was the main factor, which was bounded up with the recognition of Ukraine’s independence. All domestic researchers who have studied these things noticed the great pressure from the U.S. on Ukraine. Another peculiar feature was that unlike in Eastern Europe, where anti-communist revolutions took place precisely and Washington began to work with the opposition forces that came into power, on the post-Soviet space the situation was different. As the Secretary of State John Baker pointed out – one of the most important issues in this context for the U.S. was “who are the authority with which we can cooperate further”. Under conditions of uncertainty, which was a political background of early 1990 on the post-Soviet space, the United States declared that the West is ready to cooperate with those who adopt the Western values and democratic principles in life. At the beginning of Ukraine’s independence the Ukrainian elite had remained almost unchanged, unlike the Eastern European countries, so in foreign policy, the U.S. and other countries actually began to work with the old communist structure. In the geopolitical sense, the U.S. policy towards Ukraine and other “new” Eastern European countries – former Soviet republics, except the Baltic states, were still in the field of US-Russian relations. Unlike the Baltic republics, which almost immediately moved from “Soviet republics” in the category of “East European” states, Ukraine along with other Soviet republics remained in post-Soviet context with the strong influence of Russia as the successor to the USSR, although it had become part of the “new “Eastern Europe”. The period after the Orange Revolution was a kind of bifurcation point when the reorientation of U.S. policy toward Ukraine to the context of US-European relations could occur, as it was the case of East European democratic revolutions of 1989. We can try to identify several factors that can explain why it never happened. If to measure from Ukrainian side among the domestic factors we can name the following. Firstly, it is the uncertainty of Ukrainian foreign policy and constant changes of the main vector of foreign policy and strategic partnerships. In Eastern Europe there was no such swing, and was a clear orientation towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration, which can be roughly formulated as “only to Europe”, and nowhere else – to be out of reach of the USSR (Russia). In Ukraine, this had not happened. Secondly, it is a lack of internal consensus among the Ukrainian elite.
and the citizens, namely the “East-West” division of foreign policy preferences in Ukraine. It was one of the hallmarks of all election campaigns since 2004\(^3\) that greatly complicated the perception of any single vector foreign policy of Ukraine. Thirdly, it is a specific attitude of the Ukrainian population towards Russia. From the post-war times there are still stereotypes, which emerged during the “Cold War”: for the inhabitants of former socialist countries Russia is rather “the enemy”, for the Baltic countries – the same (occupation regime), in Ukraine completely different attitude prevails.

This is due to the continued viability of stereotypes from Soviet times about “brotherly Slavic peoples”. Also, we have to take into account implications of the resettlement policy in the USSR, when military service and the policy of division of young professionals after graduating from the neighboring republics created strong family and friendly contacts between Ukraine and Russia. We must also consider the common religious preference, proximity language and culture and history. All this has created a very different opinion in Ukraine toward Russia and its foreign policy than in Central and Eastern Europe.

Among the most important external factors we can note the following: (1) the priority of relations with Russia for all Western countries; (2) the dependence of Western Europe from Russian energy supply, and (3) specificity of the Russian view of Ukraine and its foreign policy. It will give you reasonable interpretation of Russian researchers of the current U.S. policy toward Ukraine, which in many ways resemble the approaches inherent in Soviet historiography. The main emphases are made on the fact that “Washington’s actions are intended to achieve full separation of Ukraine from Russia”\(^4\) which is very similar to Soviet historiography assessment of the U.S. East European policy during the Cold War. In general, this issue requires a thorough comprehensive separate study.

Thus, we can conclude that during the end of the Cold War the East European vector of the U.S. foreign policy had transformed to some extent: new principles and actions of American policy towards Eastern Europe had been invented; relations with the countries of the former socialist camp moved from the field of US-Soviet to US-European relations; the main implications the “new” East European policy spread towards the former Soviet republics, including Ukraine. However, over the last twenty years we can see the fact that American policy in “new” Eastern Europe remained as second-rate policy. The priority of relations with Russia as the successor to the USSR, even now determines the fate of East European countries in relations with the United States. An example of this can be the U.S. policy towards independent Ukraine.

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тор зовнішньої політики США певною мірою трансформувався: були винайдені нові засади, принципи та заходи американської політики щодо Східної Європи; взаємини з країнами колишнього соціалістичного табору перейшли з американсько-радянських у площину американсько-Європейських відносин; основні прояви «нової» східноєвропейської політики поширилися на колишні радянські республіки, у тому числі і на Україну. Втім, другорядність та підпорядкованість американсько-російським відносинам навіть «нового» східноєвропейського регіону залишилася характерною рисою американської політики в Європі. Прикладом цього може бути політика США щодо незалежної України.

**Ключові слова:** зовнішня політика, міжнародні відносини, «холодна війна», США, Україна.

Бессонова М.М. Восточноевропейский вектор внешней политики США во второй половине XX века: украинский контекст / ГУ «Институт всемирной истории НАН Украины».

Статья посвящена обзору восточноевропейского вектора среди внешнеполитических приоритетов США в период окончания «холодной войны», а также определению места Украины в новых геополитических условиях с позиций её нынешней принадлежности к восточноевропейскому региону. Со времен окончания «холодной войны» восточноевропейский вектор внешней политики США трансформировался: были выработаны новые основы, принципы и методы американской политики по отношению к Восточной Европе; взаимоотношения со странами бывшего социалистического лагеря перешли из американо-советских в плоскость американо-европейских отношений; основные проявления «новой» восточноевропейской политики распространялись на бывшие советские республики, в том числе и на Украину. Впрочем, второстепенность и подчиненность американо-российским отношениям даже «нового» восточноевропейского региона осталась характерной чертой американской политики в Европе. Примером этого может быть политика США в отношении независимой Украины.

**Ключевые слова:** внешняя политика, международные отношения, «холодная война», США, Украина.

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