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PECULIARITIES OF THE US-EU RELATIONS: EVOLUTION AND PROSPECTS

It is argued that the US-European relations, regardless of the position of the US as a single global state, are based on the principles of interdependence. Conflicts that arise on specific issues are not of strategic and decisive character. They cannot provoke fundamental conflict, primarily because of similar values and targets in the conduct of foreign policy.

Changing the status of the EU “traditional ally” into the status of “essential partner” is caused by the need to clearly define European interests in transatlantic cooperation. Relations between the EU and the US are based on protecting the interests and priorities of each party, in addition to the policy of compromise. Now the format of transatlantic cooperation is multilateral, negotiation basis of US foreign practices is combined with cooperation with the EU, confirming the practical transition of Washington to renovation of collective action. Filling the US-European relations with “global context” changes transatlantic partnership both in content and in form. The US and EU continue to be among the leaders in world politics that get additional opportunities for development and implementation of a common position on many global issues thanks to strategic partnership.

Keywords: USA, EU, US-European relations, foreign policy, partnership.

As an international actor and a global leader in political practice, the USA is associated with a geographic shape, in which this great country of today is situated. Instead, the EU is agreed to consider from political point of view in various combinations as Western Europe, as a supranational union of 28 countries in the EU or NATO. Importantly, the conceptual blurring of political category “Europe” can lose its own contradiction only after final completion of continental integration within the classical understanding of this process. Since the current state of European integration makes deconsolidation approaches, estimates and projections of future European policy and implementation of the idea of American geopolitical supremacy in decision-making. The nature of international political relations between the EU and the US may be only partially realized from the position of realistic developments and theories of interdependence, since their priority application determines the first study of Euro-American cooperation and its ongoing consequences than the deep essence of political strategies and their individual forms and methods of implementation in world politics to ensure the interests of each party.

A key element of distinction for political scientists of different schools in the study of Euro-American relations and contradictions of the postwar period is always the issue of American hegemony, equality or the rule of one party in the current international policy. But often such differences in the opinions of scientists are based on the problems of development of new forms of economic competition on the background of the transition to the information age [1]. The lack of clear political and legal mechanisms that would make possible the adoption of common decisions

and, on this basis, to regulate and legally consolidate certain transactions and events of Euro-Atlantic allies, became most visible after problems with the coordination of NATO operations in Kosovo, which remain the only consolidated solution as opposed to the dominance of American unilateralism [2].

Meanwhile, the US political opinion against the background of new contradictions in bilateral and multilateral relations between the US and Europe considers the need to adapt to the post-bipolar era, especially considering the factor of globalization that “created a confusion of identity” [3]. So P. Gordon and J. Shapiro believe that “the Americans and the Europeans can no longer be linked by a common threat, but they keep on significant long-term interest in maintaining structures, expectations, habits and commitment to cooperation, the concept of intrinsic political alliance. Being obviously powerful, the US does not assume responsibility for maintaining international order and global security allies without charge, including the European Union” [4].

Experts note that “the end of the alliance” could be a “breakthrough to transatlantic discord, like a new Cold War, the eventual cost of which would be too high: erosion of trust between the leaders; domestic political pressure to confrontation instead of cooperation; the end of NATO as an effective mechanism for joint military action; escalation of trade conflicts; reduce the desire of each side to support each other when necessary; and finally, political rivalry in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. The Europeans would see America is not more interested in them, so they could destroy the European unification, which the US supported almost 60 years” [4].

In terms of political complex theories the unique status of the EU in international relations gradually became an increasingly significant factor influencing the approach of scientists. Indeed, the fact that it increasingly difficult to define whose functions in foreign policy dominate – those of the EU or national states that are included into it, or into the diplomatic department of the European Commission or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Member States, creates an impression about the possibility of identity European foreign policy as a whole within the Euro-Atlantic community or return the continent to independence for innocence to the interventionist plans and actions of the United States. S. Krasner and J. Goldsmith determine that the cause of these events is the crisis of American idealism in the sense of “political naivety” [5].

In addition, for the world community of nations and world political thought the role of the EU as an actor of the international system along with an independent national foreign policy of the Member States of the European Union is a paradox. Some scholars rightly explain this situation as an initial lack of proper conceptual principles of a clear definition of contemporary international regime in which the states would give up their once exclusive powers, transferring them to integration unions [6].

The development of the EU as a unique structure results in limited and sometimes complete lack of empirical data to compare, because in American political literature there are relatively few special publications on international politics of the EU, whose role in the world-system is crucial. This generally dominated political thought is not appropriate US basic research and the so called “case studies”, in which the specific processes and events are mainly analyzed, not the underlying phenomena. However, American scientists from the start of the Maastricht process focused on the issue of multilateralism in relations with European allies, mistakenly avoiding the prognostic approaches to co-existence in conditions of the EU as the world’s single-system [7].

One of the key phenomena that are taken into consideration by researchers, was singling out US foreign policy with focus on the development of the world American, perceived by European allies as a breach of the principles of multilateralism and conditions of the special partnership, a refusal to consider special approaches and interests of the Europeans as a transition to unilateralism and the use of force without a deep understanding of the consequences [8]. With every manifestation of American globalism in its understanding as the process of forming the so-called global governance the critical mood of Europeans begins to grow steadily [9].

If the foundations of praxeology T. Montbrial say you want sometimes individually, but more collectively, to define and implement the designs, intended to change any part of the world [10], in the post-bipolar world the US administration is aimed at the realization of this “science of action” which would in practical terms of policy would change the world. Right in this sense is the idea of the famous American researcher of international systems N. Chomsky, who describes the events in Iraq only “test” for the West. By the way, he begins the analysis of this “test” with “Operation Desert Storm” in 1991, which outlines within a practical option attempts of the White House to implement the idea of forming a “new world order” under the aegis of the US [11]. In support of this the researcher refers to the decision of the US Administration to defend Kuwait, which suffered from armed aggression by the regime of Saddam Hussein, calling it a manifestation of chosen “hard line”. That’s when US authorities first acted not through international negotiations, but within their own responsibility for peace and stability in the world. In addition, the administration of George Bush immediately made it clear that it would not take the path of negotiations with a dictator who openly violates international law and deprives another state’s territorial integrity and sovereignty [12]. With the support of the official London the Americans managed to literally dictate the UN Security Council necessary decision by ignoring the Charter of this international organization while maintaining only the procedural nuances [13].

And the previous integration theories of 1950-1960 years were not able to determine the depth and nature of future development of Euro-Atlantic cooperation, as they were largely inherent descriptiveness and explanation of processes and events

primarily for permanent simultaneous appeal to the pessimistic projections in terms of political integration. The main international political element of these theories is the assertion that Europe is too weak militarily to claim to be the second pole of power as a kind of substitution for the US in international relations [14]. An international renowned researcher J. Rosenau considers the issues in the light of the contradictions of American global Board [15].

As for the developers, fans and followers of the theory of interdependence, even before the Maastricht Treaty they saw the EU mainly within the political economy approach. It is natural that the founders of the theory of political science theorists of international relations R. Keohane and J. Nye distinguish such a problem as the difficulty to produce a clear approach and a clear idea of the possible concessions military and economic powers in matters of monetary and ocean policy [16]. Moreover, this theory for a long time was considered to be one-sided, as the study of “relations” deprived the predictive accuracy of scientific analysis in view of the fact that world-system acted mainly the background and not the object of study. Relevant findings were. This is natural in the backdrop of the state of scientific political thought was practical rejection of the use of geo-political paradigm, which is known to be used almost exclusively on large empires and nation-states. A certain except can be considered an aspect of “geographical location”, which draws attention of American researchers J. Roche and G. Pickett to the study of interventionist US policy [17].

Constructivist and neorealist approaches in the study of the political context of the EU also applied tangentially because of the lack of adequate legal and political framework for analysis and implementation of joint decision-making within the traditional diplomatic structures and institutions. Affected confusion and answer the question of whether the EU as political and legal institution can be considered as an individual actor of the international system. And functionalist method that looked borrowed from the arsenal of political economy, didn't have at its disposal sufficient facts to study international political features of the EU. Introduced by D. Mitrany on the background of establishing the EEC in 1956 [18], it was developed and adapted to modern realities by E. Haas and got the name “neofunctionalism” [19], which also makes it impossible to bring the evaluation of corresponding functions of this integration unit beyond political economy after adoption of the Maastricht.

Ultimately, the use of methods of theoretical and methodological arsenal of neofunctionalism, political regimes, the world-systems, linkage politics can detect only some elements in the international politics of the EU, but does not allow to systemize the study of Euro-American cooperation. According to the same R. Keohane and J. Nye, it affects the use of “communications regardless” [16]. For all these reasons, the empirical approach to Euro-American interaction dominated for a long time in the international political thought, which in a certain stage of development of historical and political thought was important as made it possible to accumulate adequate amount of information for modern political science.

As it rightly observed in fundamental work “The Theory of International Relations” by P. Viotti, M. Kauppi, this is very important as it helps the scientific synthesis, but the authors themselves in cases of study international relations of the era of globalization prefer the so-called philosophical approach to political thought, that a combination of scientific methodology and political ideology. This situation also explains the lack of crystallized ideas about the state and prospects of a common EU foreign policy. An attempt to isolate the foreign policy of the EU, as opposed to that carried out by individual EU member states attracts attention [20; 21; 22].

The matter is in the fact that some members of EU have different approaches and opportunities to influence the working out the common position on US policy. The US also has certain limitations in making decisions about their relations with certain countries of the EU as it is necessary to take into account the overall context of international cooperation. It's also affected the differentiated EU approach to the institutional support of common foreign policy (Office of the European Commission, Council of Ministers, the European Council, etc.), the presence of the diplomatic office in the EU and NATO, some international political functions of the OSCE and the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and PACE factor as well. By reasonable statement of J. Singer, this approach “allows just address the main problems faced by the international community ... The human conditions, in fact, are morally unacceptable. Too many people continue to die prematurely from wars, terrorism, murder, poverty, starvation, epidemics, disease, and even more from an unprecedented poverty...” [23].

Another important methodological point is that the postwar US administration was guided by political prospects with the active assistance of economic recovery in Western Europe. America needed a stable and preferably most dependent partner in its fight against communist expansion. The presence of a common enemy mobilized members of the transatlantic alliance, predetermined not only the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty, but also regional economic integration in Europe.

At the same time the fundamental features of a radically new international political doctrine of the United States certainly has been affected by long isolationist dominant, the essence of which found its explanation in the Monroe Doctrine in the context of US-European relations. Finally, an important factor of in-depth understanding of the essence of the US European policy, which experienced a crisis stage under President George Bush, serves a real turn of American foreign policy to Reagan anti-interventionism era to promote and initiate democratic processes in the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the general democratic content of international political doctrines and policies of US administrations post-bipolar era, on the other.

With the collapse of the bipolar system of international relations significant changes took place in paradigm of interdependence as a fundamental principle of essential era of globalization, i.e. the US in the international arena began a policy of global domination. If during the Cold War American interventionism formed various options with regard to the position of European allies, the American interventionist

foreign policy of post-Cold War era was built without allied obligations. That is, in the era of the Cold War the practical implementation of the principle of political interdependence of the US and European countries dominated, the collapse of the USSR led to drastic changes in the content of American interventionism that acquired signs of unilateralism in making and implementing decisions.

Thus, the position of the US president administration was of post-bipolar era was determined by one of the functionaries of the National Security A. Lake, who believed that “we clearly have to be ready to repel strong and unilateral” [24, p. 39]. As for George W. Bush, professor S. Schier made a detailed description. He stressed that “...the initial project of G.W. Bush presidency was in the political reconstruction of national policy, governance and politics, launched by Ronald Reagan in 1981. The analysis of the characteristics of George W. Bush second term shows the policies and tactics, commensurate with those of Reagan’s. They are inherent ultimate goal and triumph of national Reagan administration: military power, tax cuts, a powerful executive branch of Congress and stable electoral majority which prefers conservative Republicans. G.W. Bush mostly involved in the project of political restoration, while using innovative means tactically” [25].

Instead, the financial and economic constraints on the implementation of American globalism begin to directly affect its abilities, which did not affect the globalist aspirations of both US administrations. If before the collapse of the USSR the US economy had virtually no serious competitors then had to post-bipolar era of gradual convergence of US, EU, China, Japan, India, the growing importance of national economies of Indonesia, Brazil, the other contenders for the status of developed countries. Transatlantic community energy dependence on supplies from the Middle East, Latin America and Russia acquires political importance. You cannot underestimate such factors as reducing the competitiveness of American goods and services, and end of the era of total US technological superiority.

American consumer society seeks to be persuaded that the main prerequisite for the preservation and improvement of the standard of living is a stable world economy. International observer of “Newsweek” magazine F. Zakaria, however, emphasizes on the withdrawal of the United States from a number of international agreements as the manifestation of disrespect to this world [26]. Interdependence, of which was said and written so much by the representatives of US political and economic thought, has become a serious reality that affects every segment of national development much more than the most serious regional conflicts. However, this fact did not reduce the desire of the 43rd US president to unilateralism and total rule [27].

The decisive impetus for this approach is that it is at the peak of the understanding of international terrorists inflict a severe blow to America, choosing the main objects of national pride of the country – the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The outside world is divided almost immediately in the minds of the Americans in two colors – black and white – with a certain analogy with times of systemic confrontation. Conventionally, it can be argued that the place of the USSR as the

main opponent and the enemy is given to international terrorism. There is a new surge of politicization and ideological outlook of the American electorate, so that is objectively inevitable rise to power of the US president, oriented to the international political activities and the fight against “external evil”, along with international terrorism gets called “axis of evil”. President totally denies the possibility of containment strategies in view of the existence in the world “unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction that can be delivered by missiles or secretly delivered to terrorist allies” [28]. US are under the direction of George W. Bush returned to a policy of global responsibility, which is largely based on independent decisions of White House and National Security Council. The very concept of such globalization called sharply critical mood in Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union strongly reduced the desire of the Europeans to share with the Americans the cost of international political and especially military-political projects. Even the terrorist threat has not significantly changed this state of affairs, because in its desire to share responsibility through joint Euro-American Leadership America does not find a positive reaction in European capitals.

As the well-known researchers of international systems state, the terrorist threat has initiated a profound transformation of US foreign policy, but it became so, that it is not shared by the Europeans. This misunderstanding is mutual, as the impact on all aspects of international relations, from mediation (or lack of it cooperation in the Middle East cooperation) to cooperation (or lack of it) in the defense against attacks on transatlantic trade policies to weapons of mass destruction [29, p. 1-42].

In the era of joint struggle for survival in opposition to the “evil empire” American arguments prevailed, but the new formula of life of the modern world-system, based on socio-economic development and prosperity, has led to different approaches of the US and EU to international cooperation. US are essentially interested in the stability of the global economy, realizing that otherwise the US national economy will suffer significant losses, and the EU cannot be considered an exclusive partner of America in political issues that negatively affect the relations with the countries on which European economy is dependent.

Thus, in the scientific political thought of the USA dominates the argument: the more powerful is economic integration of the key economic centers of our time, the more indivisible international security becomes. In this sense, American experts say that during the confrontation the US system involved insurance of different regions from penetration of the Soviet Union, and now it begins to “fight” with the countries of these regions to protect itself from their destructive influence on the growth of US GDP. But not always similarly the situation in Europe is perceived. According to European economist A. Muller, the interventionist approach fails to stabilize economic development in an interdependent world [30].

The growth of political differences between the EU and the US in strategic contradictions most actively began to emerge during the Balkan crisis of the early 1990s, for which George Bush and Bill Clinton administrations at once took overtly

interventionist stance. However, it should be taken into consideration that the Balkans immediately with the end of the Cold War the Balkans were determined by the US and the EU as a key subject of joint efforts aimed first at keeping the integrity of Yugoslavia. Thus, the first official US reaction to Croatian independence referendum on May 21, 1991 became apparent in confirmation of “the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia within the current borders” [31, p. 33]. Both parties were against direct intervention of NATO at the early stages of the conflict. “Marginalization” of UN caused by the sole US decisions regarding the Bosnian conflict and the Kosovo war, demonstrated first, the relative weakness of the EU in its relations with the US, and secondly, the intension of Clinton administration to act independently in the region. However, the first signs of joint Western intervention in the conflict which became the result of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, did not lead to fundamental differences in the transatlantic community. At least this situation, with certain abnormalities, was observed until 1995, when the US and NATO joint efforts stopped the war in Bosnia. At the beginning of the Bosnian crisis Western policy seemed relatively consistent; there was a unity of strength and common assessments. Despite the fact that multilateral organizations such as the EU, OSCE, NATO and the UN were involved in Yugoslav crisis, the role of the United States and its European allies immediately became decisive. This war involving the United States for the first time clearly questioned the Europeans agreed on reckless American supremacy [32].

The factor of activation of the US and the EU consolidated efforts became a common desire to include the Balkan countries into the European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The factor of consolidation efforts is also common desire to prevent the transformation of the Balkans into the environment of organized crime, terrorism and mass migration. It is equally important to consider the joint need for the parties in preventing the spread of instability in the Balkans to other regions of Europe. A crucial element of controversy that eventually turned into differences and contradictions were different estimates by the Americans and the Europeans the interests of the parties participating in the Balkan conflict. If for the administration of Bill Clinton the issue was minor, the Europeans didn't have for a long time a common position. It greatly influenced the leading US role in the Balkans. Using interventionist strategy, the United States gradually took a crucial role in making and implementing decisions regarding the feasibility and levels of armed intervention in the Yugoslav conflict [33].

Note that at the beginning of the conflict, i.e. in 1991-1992 the EU based its foreign policy on the basis of the so-called European political cooperation, which did not include discussion of security issues. Although the EU had no clearly articulated policies and mechanisms for the settlement of the Balkan crisis, the policy of integrated association allows distinguishing such key EU positions on conflicts in the Balkans:

- EU immediately and clearly divided the post-socialist and post-Soviet states into two categories: if CEE immediately perceived as potential EU members then former Soviet Union states were put beyond the frames of Europe expansion. Regarding to states post-Yugoslav states the position of the EU was formed in the phased conflict resolution and cessation of war;

- the main component of EU influence on events in neighboring regions was the economy. On the one hand, the economic power of the EU made it attractive for most post-socialist and post-Soviet states; on the other hand, the EU for the same economic reasons could not afford an immediate expansion. However, even the mid-1990s. Brussels budding post-Yugoslav states the possibility of EU membership;

- an independent EU's role in the Yugoslav conflicts cannot be spoken about due to the fact that it shared the responsibility with NATO and the OSCE.

Crucial remained the role of key actors of the EU, which were and still are Germany, France and Great Britain. So Germany almost immediately put forward the idea of gradual enlargement, which led to diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in December 1991. However, Germany could not use its armed forces abroad in accordance with the constitutional limitations [34]. France almost immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union also supported the expansion of Europe, while paying attention to new threats to the European economy. Instead, the French have put forward the idea of expanding the WEU and its transformation into the backbone of the European security structure. In the matter of the Bosnian conflict, the French argued for a compromise between the participating parties of the conflict. Official London acted within the strategy of the special partnership with the United States and therefore not particularly demonstrated particular positions in the Yugoslav conflict.

In all cases, when it comes to conflicts in the Balkans, we can speak rather of bilateral than multilateral approach in Europe to solve them, in view of the specific interests of individual EU member states, as a priority in Germany were Croatia and Slovenia, in Italy - Slovenia, Croatia and Albania, in France – Romania, in Greece – Serbia and Bulgaria. Yet, the EU's position in the Yugoslav conflict was fairly consolidated. It led to the fact that the European community has taken an active part in conciliation, which reduced the risk of conflict expansion from the Balkan region to other post-socialist Europe.

Only after the American campaign in Kosovo, the EU and the Member States of the Union have begun to assume a decisive role in post-war settlement. It was the EU initiative of development and implementation, together with the World Bank, the plan for economic revival of the Balkan countries, and also agreements on stabilization within the convergence Balkan countries with the EU. Proclamation in Brussels number of post-Yugoslav states candidates for EU Member States seriously affected the stability in the region. The joint agreement between the EU and NATO on 29 July 2003 on the joint approach to solving the problems of the Western Balkans was another important step along the way.

Cooperation between the US and EU in the Balkans resulted in increased cooperation of post-Yugoslav states with the transatlantic alliance. Thus after all the conflicts and wars the role of the EU became crucial as the European Union as a powerful integration formation actively involved in solving the key to the Balkan peoples and states problems such as the economic crisis and caused by it mass unemployment and poverty; assistance to refugees and displaced families; provision and equitable distribution of funds for reconstruction and development; advocacy with governments and political forces on the feasibility of reforms; effective assistance in carrying out political and legal reforms to combat corruption and fight organized crime; active participation in determining the status of Kosovo, and Serbia and Montenegro; ensuring stability in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement.

Thus, the active presence of the EU in the conflict in Kosovo and Bosnia, as well as the joint strategy of NATO, combined with the prospect of enlargement of the EU and NATO to post-Yugoslav states have become key elements of influence in the region. Its role gradually began to play and the critical position of the EU and individual European states concerning the US over-autonomy in the design, implementation and adopted decisions on armed intervention in the Balkans.

Experience in the Balkan settlement confirmed the high possibility to counter the European Union to the USA further implementation of independent actions in regional conflicts. However, the response of the Europeans to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 confirmed the high degree of unity of the parties in strategic issues relating to the particular problems of democratization and the introduction of a market economy. The EU played an important role for USA gradual returning to the idea of the crucial role of the UN in the adoption and implementation of international policies. Brussels and other European capitals are firmly convinced that only joint efforts of members of the transatlantic community can avoid new fratricidal wars, including the Balkans. An important element of the current situation is considered the recognition of the European Union as a separate actor of international relations, capable to solve problems of the region.

Undoubtedly, transatlantic relations and the corresponding alliance is the most powerful that they ever knew in the history. Their status and level is influenced by situation in the international arena in general and in certain countries in particular. At the beginning of the XXI century main problem in bilateral and multilateral relations in the Western world is the Middle East and international terrorism, which is associated with this region. Middle Eastern policy of the EU and the US serves the fundamental barrier to the final establishment of stable relations of special partnership. The ability of the Western community of nations to keep peace in the region and on the global environment fundamentally depends on its coordination.

However, when it comes to the Middle East, that are noticeable different, often conflicting estimations of US and European principles and values, as the US and the EU have different priorities for the Middle East. A few years ago, Europeans clearly perceived the idea of American leadership in the Middle East and supported the

central role of the US in the region due to the fact that US policy was able to ensure the stability of oil supply, to create a network of pro-Western regimes, to ensure the security of Israel. So it was during the war with Iraq in 1991 when US forces protected the sovereignty of Kuwait, and during the entire period of the Middle East peace settlement which began at the Madrid conference. In the 1990s the Europeans were supported by the United States concerning various sanctions against Iraq, taken by the United Nations. This also applies to deter Iran's nuclear ambitions. However, in the late XX century the Europeans gradually became critical of simplistic assessments of US policy in the Middle East, and the Iraq crisis at the beginning of XXI century caused a radical change in the position of the EU Member States. A striking aspect of the differences of the US and EU considered attitude to the prospects for a Palestinian state. Unlike the US, Western Europe cautiously denied Israel's position, based on the attitude to the Palestinian problem in the frames of so-called international terrorism. When Bill Clinton took relatively moderate positions on these issues, then George W. Bush strongly supported Ariel Sharon position, which was that the Palestinians are a threat to the Israeli state. Already in the first months after the attacks of September 11, 2001, it became clear that Europeans tend to approach a balanced policy in the Middle East, criticizing the brutal actions of both parties and seeking a diplomatic solution of the problem.

In addition to differences in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and forms of containment of Saddam Hussein, the Europeans gradually began to show dissatisfaction about aggressive US strategy against Iran. If the EU wanted to deal with Iran on the basis of a constructive dialogue that began in mid-2000 with the adoption of the Agreement on Trade and Cooperation, the US preferred the strategy of pressure. It began even by Bill Clinton administration, but it was George W. Bush who referred Iran to the “axis of evil” states. It should take into account the effect from November 1, 1993 the principle of Common Foreign and Security Policy, confirmed by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. After the terrorist attacks in 2001 it became evident that the EU and the US are moving to an independent foreign policy. In political thought appear contrasting positions “atlantists” and “autonomists”, as confirmed by European policy in the Middle East which acquires ever clearer signs of independence.

However, differences in approaches not immediately grew into a controversy, as many European governments certainly supported the decision of the US administration regarding the occupation of Iraq. Some of them have contributed to this campaign by sending ground troops there. When international inspectors didn't confirm the presence in Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and terrorist arsenals, position integrated position of transatlantic alliance began to disintegrate. With each following month of the Iraq war, more and more states and societies of the EU began to deny American Leadership in the Middle East, but in the European Union different approaches to the settlement of the Iraq problem remained.

The differences in the transatlantic community in approaches to the Middle East settlement are constantly growing due to the fact that the Europeans and the Americans celebrated different levels depending on energy supplies from the Middle East. This explains the US desire to maintain and develop its role as a regional hegemon. For their part, European governments prefer to remain outside sources influencing the situation in the region. The US continues to insist on the expediency of the use of force, while the EU seeks only a peaceful settlement, which, according to most European countries, can provide a stable peace and cooperation in the region. Different approaches the US and EU Middle East settlement problems lie in the fact that:

- on the relationship of Israel and Palestine, the US says Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not so much a classic confrontation of terrorism as Israel's struggle for survival in a hostile environment, partially ignoring the same right to the other side. So the Americans view Israel carries out acts of self-defense, while the Palestinians are using terrorist methods. Despite the proclaimed recognition of the right of both parties to the state, not enough the US government supports the right of Palestinians to their own state. For their part, the Europeans believe that both Israelis and Palestinians involved in the conflict in which both sides have resorted to unacceptable means. States of the EU, unlike the US, equally condemn violence of Palestinians and Israelis. Also, the Europeans tend to retain the role of a particular mediator in the conflict;

- for international terrorism, the government officials and politicians of US policy entirely convinced that the Middle East was formed and shaped a serious terrorist threat to American power. In the US, exaggeration assessments of terrorist threats coming from the Middle East are noticeable. In Washington, separating the fight against terrorism on the political and regional settlement, they deny the link between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and international terrorism, stressing that the aim of the terrorists is primarily the destruction of Western civilization. Another feature of American position is to establish a direct relationship between the nature of political regimes and their attitude to international terrorism. Thus the need to use force against such regimes, under the pretext of the terrorist threat is predetermined.

In Europe, international terrorism is also considered one of the threats to national and collective security. Condemning the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States the Europeans consider terrorism as a complex phenomenon, specific phenomenon that is not related to the situation in the Middle East. Another difference in the EU position on that of the US is that the Europeans favor the use of different methods of combating terrorism, which must include a combination of military and diplomatic means, international cooperation and political means of settlement. A crucial element of the differences between the US and the EU is opposite approaches to the democratization of political regimes in the Middle East;

- As for political regimes, the US is convinced that regional governments are friendly and hostile to the leading international actors. The US government denies

any dialogue with hostile regimes, where there was a desire to overthrow the political regime of Saddam Hussein, and after that - to change the power in Iran and Syria. So they do not rule out the use of force against countries which violate or intend to disrupt the regime of non-proliferation, and which contribute to international terrorism. The key difference with Europe is seen in the fact that the US government may resort to military action without the approval of the international community of nations. The Europeans do not share a clear gradation of Middle Eastern regimes to friendly and hostile. In their view, democracy cannot be imposed by force of arms, as they are convinced that the political regime can be changed through dialogue as the best way to move the peace process and regional cooperation.

Therefore, different European and American perceptions of the Middle East can lead to further convergence or split, consolidation or growth of contradictions in the transatlantic alliance. Dual dimension have internal sources of differences, especially when it comes to the EU, especially evident lack of unity among the EU countries, which applies to both form of EU involvement in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and economic sanctions on both sides, which Germany, the UK and the Netherlands are denying from economic and energy reasons. There are political differences on issues of settling the Middle East conflict in the Franco-German position, on the one hand, and the Spanish-British approach, on the other. However, a gradual transition of European countries to jointly develop forms and methods of Middle East settlement will facilitate convergence of positions of the EU and awareness of the impossibility for a separate European country to play a key role in this critical region.

Finally, less obvious but also significant is the fact that between Europe and the Middle East there are different approaches to political regimes that have historical origins and lie in the fact that the Europeans have already moved to an integration course, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reflects trends of formation of national states. The Europeans are convinced that this conflict can be solved through international cooperation [35].

Given the EU's position on the Middle East conflict, experts stress the following elements:

- EU and EU Member States consider the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to be potentially the greatest threat to the international system, as the EU seeks to deepen its involvement in solving it with the help of economic diplomacy and means forcing Israel and Palestine to the application of the general principles of inter-state settlement;

- Europe is convinced that the US war in Iraq led to a surge of new threats in the region, as the EU and the Member States of the Union are making application of the principles of international law in the strategy for Democracy, territorial integrity, peace and security in the region. Thus the EU as an international actor sees the crucial role of the Security Council in the development and decision-making; Europeans are convinced of the expediency of parallel curb Iran's nuclear ambitions

and gradual democratization of Iranian political regime. Brussels and other European capitals set to support moderate political forces of Iran to thus affect the entire Middle East;

- the most effective means of combating international terrorism in Europe as well in the USA, considered the democratization of political regimes, but the difference between the positions of the US and EU is that the European side in favor of passing the problem of terrorism in the processes of dialogue and multilateral negotiations between different political forces; while the EU supports the use of force in international relations solely on the basis of the UN Charter and international law;

- without denying the leading role of the United States and supporting the overall objective of US strategy in the region, the Europeans sought active involvement of local governments and communities to resolve conflict. Crucial to the special position of the EU is the principle of mandatory presence of the UN and international community of nations in developing decisions on the Middle East settlement.

US Political Thought considers the origins of terrorism as a social evil is in revolutionary and rebel movements in the second half of the 1960s. It is not only the Middle East but also the Cuban revolution, Nicaraguan Contras as well. However, American researchers agree on the civilization origin of international terrorism, seeing them in relation to the intransigence of Islamic fundamentalists to Western democracies. For their part, European political scientists tend to view modern terrorism mainly in the context of the division of the world into rich and poor parts. European political thought is not inclined to associate international terrorism solely with the Middle East process.

The smallest difference in the development of strategies to combat international terrorism appears to impose sanctions against countries with territory which it applies. Both in the US and in Europe sanctions are considered not very effective tool which harms ordinary people more than terrorists. But economic sanctions are one of the factors influencing the behavior of national governments in the states of covered terrorism. US and European countries seeking to further coordinate their efforts in the fight against terrorism, which does not reduce the contradictions in international cooperation. It affects different historical experiences of terrorist threats, different attitudes of society, as well as a higher level of energy dependence of Europe from the Middle East.

The differences in estimates of the Middle East have been and remain a key component of the contradictions between the US and Europe. For the US administration practically any terrorist threat is related to the region. There are certain factual justifications for this. So 18 of 24 more or less significant acts of terrorism in 1960-90s were the results of certain events within the Middle East conflict. It cannot but affect that such European countries as Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain in the historical past were targets of terrorist attacks of domestic origin (ETA, Red Brigades and so on), so foreign terrorism for a long time was there relatively minor. Finally, it should be noted that not all contradictions in the attitude

of the transatlantic allies to international terrorism, but rather, to the struggle with it are caused by various grades and positions of the US and the EU. Only Italy, Spain, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria gave unconditional support for US operations in Iraq. France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg most actively opposed military intervention in Iraq. As noted W. Schawcross, “America is both powerful and very destructive force of the modern world. I believe that the key area is this: despite all its mistakes, the American involvement and the American sacrifice are significant for the world ... responsibility of America and its allies are huge. You can achieve certainty only in case of their success. Alternative looks terrible” [14].

In general, Washington continues to treat its European allies as the most “natural” ones in terms of value partners, expecting understanding and specific contribution to cooperation, particularly in the military and political operations. Strengthening transatlantic relations essentially focuses on what is for the American administration and Europe among key international priorities today (Afghanistan, Middle East, Russia, the fight against terrorism). That is not to say that hope for improvement is unfounded: on most political issues and geopolitical preferences Democrat Barack Obama is really much closer to Europe than the Republicans George W. Bush and John McCain. In addition, the world after the global crisis in 2009 became somewhat different because with the rise of developing countries, the relative weakness of the US after the Iraq war, both sides of the Atlantic are becoming more dependent on each other and have to act effectively in the global space, but the practice of cooperation demonstrates the complexity of the process. Europe has a special place in American foreign policy, but relations between the EU and the US vary depending on the situation. Deprived static, they take different forms of flexible cooperation, mutual influence and sometimes substitutability. America of Barack Obama looks more “westernized” for both its predecessors in conceptual vision, and in methods of foreign policy. The concept of “smart power” is defined as the basis for the use of all elements of American power – diplomacy, military force, intelligence, police, economy, culture, declaring the effectiveness of dialogue, persuasion and influence, prefer multilateral actions, demonstrate the outlook which more realistically adapted to the fact of multipolarity growth. All these elements are largely correlated with the European approach to international issues and foreign policy, including complex social and local features to eliminate the root causes of terrorism and the strategy of “indirect action”.

EU members, as it happened in the history of US-European relations, are faced with a major American paradox: the US does not support the efforts of the EU to act completely independently in areas they consider their prerogative, it demonstrates doubts about the ability of a united Europe to develop and uphold a single strategy of international interactions. This situation is particularly in Afghanistan, which has become a priority for the administration of Barack Obama, but also the source of frustration for European public opinion. The growth of “Americanization” command and criticism from the United States as for the quality of European contribution

prompted representatives of the European component of NATO Swedish Foreign Minister C. Bildt and NATO Secretary General A. Rasmussen to recall the USA the importance of recognition of actions of its partners in Europe [36].

According to the researcher M. Stürmer, “the EU has no patrons in heaven, and the US is in a state of over-voltage and does not want to or cannot rescue Europe from the consequences of their weakness”. Describing the key difference in the actions of allies in the international arena, the researcher points out: “Europe is competing in the lighter weight category easier than it could. And the Europeans have no one to blame but themselves that ‘increasingly close alliance’ based on the Roman arrangements turned into an impossible fantasy and even Germans have forgotten how to dream. EU enlargement was carried out by the deepening integration. By 1990 the US protected the Europeans from the effects of reckless decisions and actions, now when the problems and their solutions have moved to the global dimension, the EU met general information legislation, providing others to deal with the global agenda” [37; 38].

However, despite the serious differences in US-European relations, there is little doubt about the appropriateness of the strategic partnership the United States and the EU. First of all we are talking about an economic dimension, as in the context of globalization it is difficult to overestimate the weight of economic factors (EU members and the United States together produce 60% of global GDP, 40% of world trade and 62% of foreign direct investment, trade flows between the EU and the US were about 1.7 billion euro a day). The European Union is not only the main goal of US foreign direct investment, but is also a major investor to America.

It is clear that economic relations between Europe and the United States marked intensity, especially in three areas: firstly, significant disagreements remain on both sides of the Atlantic to conduct economic policy, because Americans criticize the financial and political scope of the EU in the management of international financial flows, impact of which is determined by the volume of international financial transactions that at times exceeds the volume of transactions related to trade in goods and services; secondly, negotiations on trade are traditionally difficult dimension of cooperation and competition in the US and the EU; thirdly, the US current account deficit and its potential consequences for the “euro” are a factor that creates additional tension in US-European relations [39]. Since the economic relations remains the potential for conflict, the transatlantic disagreements will be considered at the trial as through mutual doubts about the compliance of national legislation with WTO rules and the scope of anti-dumping measures and anti-subsidy in relation to industrial goods and agricultural products that can be used as the reasoning and tools to achieve goals in other areas of foreign policy.

Structural differences in the geographical distribution of international responsibility and attitude to military power emphasize controversial US-European security relationship. The United States is the only truly global actor, to some extent practical part in the international process in each of the key strategic regions of the

world, presenting itself as a leader of the international system. Europeans also tend to participate in maintaining international order, but rather as builders, not as a guarantee that assume key responsibility for the power component of international actions.

The shift in responsibility criteria and the degree of interference in global international space leads to asymmetry of interests and, of course, to differences in priorities of international politics. Analysts stress when you have to choose between the law and order, the Europeans tend to choose the right while the Americans do justice to order. These “arbitrage differences” can be seen in the transatlantic contradictions on multilateral agreements which the United States considers an obstacle to providing a guarantor of world order [40]. Structural differences help to explain why partners should always look for ways to balance and coordination, and facilitate understanding of how the methods of reconciliation and coordination could contribute to a certain ideological and political convergence. However, the EU joins the White House effort to create a more effective multilateral system, offering a set of rules and principles that should guide international security and initiate institutional reforms necessary to ensure the participation of all relevant actors in the maintenance of international peace and stability.

Experts often emphasize the fact that the sense of security interdependence underlies the vision of Obama’s foreign policy. The same proves in his book “The Post-American” by F. Zakaria, who notes that “the US must move from hegemonic strategies to leadership strategies. The choice of the administration of Democrats in favor of grand strategy of internationalism is a pragmatic one, in view that America should work closely with allies and partners to tackle common threats to international and transnational problems” [41].

Supporters of Barack Obama national security strategy argued that US foreign policy has changed in his presidency, and, above all, allies evident radical departure from the confrontational style of its driving, at least in theory this factor creates opportunities for EU ambitions in terms of effective multilateralism. Critics of the policy of Barack Obama in the US and Europe argue that the harsh reality of power, unilateral American interests and continuity of traditions will inevitably prevail. The differences in emphasis, priorities, development of applied politics as well as the differences in strategic thinking lead to different views on US targets which are more or less clear for the Europeans. But the Europeans are seeking further clarification of US security strategy, and the strategy on climate change and trade negotiations that are marked with differences.

Strategic Priorities of the USA and Europe are not defined in exactly the same order: for Europe it is the Middle East, Russia, the Balkans, for the US it is Afghanistan, China and the Middle East. The EU cannot afford over selectivity in external actions, however, acting in correlation with the main priorities of the agenda of Barack Obama, it is trying to act and for its own benefit. Thus, D. Hamilton and N. Foster record that the EU efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan make “much to

determine the credibility of Europe in the eyes of Washington as a global safety player and its ability to deploy “soft power” [42].

The current state of bilateral relations shows that the atmosphere of dialogue between the US and the EU over the last period clearly improved, but America and Europe continue to differ in some fundamental positions, namely, the US still pay less attention to environmental protection, but is more biased to participate in armed conflicts than the Europeans. Also problematic is considered uneven perceptions of Barack Obama and the US in various European countries. Mostly European Union remains the same bureaucratic institution to which intra-European relations deepening is equally important as the expansion. Thus, enlargement has demonstrated sufficiently rapid progress, although most European countries have different views on deepening integration processes.

Since the report “Towards Post-American Europe” Research Centre “European Council on Foreign Relations” the importance of transatlantic relations is characterized as a process overlaps and differences between the American “pragmatism” in search of a stronger Europe and agreed in the context of international transformations (economic crisis, Afghanistan, terrorism) and enlarged Europe as US geopolitical logic prevails common European goals. Undoubtedly, the Lisbon Treaty does not change the structural asymmetry of transatlantic cooperation: the administration of Barack Obama defines US foreign policy and the EU should coordinate common positions in international relations of 28 states of supranational organization [40].

In the global world of “multiple partners” EU retains its status of “traditional ally” of the United States, although American politicians are less interested in Europe for themselves and more interested in military and non-military contributions that Europe can offer to solve global problems. Washington believes that the transatlantic relationship cannot be limited, so traditional allies must work together to build relationships and partnerships with other actors in international relations. Can be considered unchanged US position on EU security and defense, which is internally inconsistent and related to the assessment of the use of military capabilities in Europe, affecting the ability to confront the problems of post-conflict reconstruction and military operations in different parts of the world. Barack Obama administration’s approach to the European Security and Defense Policy administration is close to that of George W. Bush’s in 2005, when pragmatism and coordination of efforts demanded to focus on specific coalitions and solving bilateral or trilateral issues. Wherein NATO is seen as a principal security tool for the US and Europe, particularly in situations when Washington does not wish to interfere in solving some of the problems of international development, the Europeans are trying to demonstrate the ability to take the initiative, referring to the United States for advisory or technical assistance [43].

Therefore, in progress in US-European relations at beginning of the XXI century you can state the victory of mutual pragmatism. Experts believe that change in the

EU's status from "traditional allies" to that of "essential partners" is caused by the need to clearly define European interests in transatlantic cooperation, where relations between the EU and the US are based on protecting the interests and priorities of each party, in addition to the policy of compromise. Currently, the format of transatlantic cooperation remains multilevel, negotiation basis for US foreign practices combined with cooperation with the EU, which confirm the practical transition of Washington to renovation of collective actions. Enrichment of US-European relations with "global context" changes transatlantic partnership practice both in content and in form, as the US and the EU remain significant leaders of world politics, which, in addition to protect their competitive advantage obtain through strategic partnership further opportunities for the development and implementation common consensus positions on many issues of global problems. Transatlantic unity remains some ballast to the manifestations of complex processes of modern international political evolution, but for any scenario of strategic cooperation it is clear that no country or alliance of nations can ensure its safety in narrow geographic scope, that's why discussions on the development of the transatlantic partnership facing the global level in its historical and conceptual perspective.

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Лакишик Д.М. Особливості відносин США та ЄС: еволюція та перспективи.

Аргументовано, що американсько-європейські відносини, незалежно від позиції США як єдиної глобальної держави, базуються на принципах взаємозалежності. Суперечності, що виникають з окремих питань, не мають стратегічного і тим більше вирішального характеру. Вони не можуть спровокувати фундаментальний конфлікт, передусім через аналогічні ціннісні і цільові орієнтири в проведенні зовнішньої політики.

Зміна статусу ЄС з «традиційного союзника» на статус «необхідного партнера» зумовлюється потребою чіткого визначення європейських інтересів у трансатлантичному співробітництві. Відносини між ЄС і США будуються на захисті інтересів і пріоритетів кожної зі сторін на додаток до політики компромісу. Нині формат трансатлантичного співробітництва залишається багаторівневим, переговорна основа зовнішньополітичної практики США поєднана зі співпрацею з ЄС, що засвідчує практичний перехід Вашингтона до поновлення колективних дій. Наповнення американсько-європейських відносин «глобальним контекстом» змінює практику трансатлантичного партнерства і за змістом, і за формою. США і ЄС продовжують залишатися одними з лідерів світової політики, які отримують додаткові можливості для формування та реалізації спільної позиції з багатьох питань глобальної проблематики завдяки стратегічному партнерству.

Ключові слова: США, ЄС, американсько-європейські відносини, зовнішня політика, партнерство.

Лакишик Д.М. Особенности отношений США и ЕС: эволюция и перспективы.

Аргументировано, что американско-европейские отношения, независимо от позиции США как единственного глобального государства, основаны на принципах взаимозависимости. Противоречия, возникающие по отдельным вопросам, не имеют стратегического и тем более решающего характера. Они не могут спровоцировать фундаментальный конфликт, прежде всего, из-за аналогичных ценностных и целевых ориентиров в проведении внешней политики.

Изменение статуса ЕС с «традиционного союзника» на статус «необходимого партнера» обусловлено потребностью четкого определения европейских интересов в трансатлантическом сотрудничестве. Отношения между ЕС и США строятся на защите интересов и приоритетов каждой из сторон в дополнение к политике компромисса. Сейчас формат трансатлантического сотрудничества остается многоуровневым, переговорная основа внешнеполитической практики США сопряжена с сотрудничеством с ЕС, что свидетельствует о практическом переходе Вашингтона к возобновлению коллективных

действий. Наполнение американо-европейских отношений «глобальным контекстом» меняет практику трансатлантического партнерства, как по содержанию, так и по форме. США и ЕС продолжают оставаться одними из лидеров мировой политики, получают дополнительные возможности для формирования и реализации общей позиции по многим вопросам глобальной проблематики благодаря стратегическому партнерству.

Ключевые слова: США, ЕС, американо-европейские отношения, внешняя политика, партнерство.