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# THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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## CHAPTER 3

# Institutional Capacity of the Euro-Atlantic Security System in the Conditions of Russia's Military Aggression Against Ukraine

### ABSTRACT

The article examines the historical background of the Euro-Atlantic security system, traces Russia's imperial wars, examines Russia's relations with NATO, analyses Ukraine's relations with NATO, proves Russia's aggressive nature, identifies NATO's weaknesses and develops recommendations for enhancing NATO's effectiveness. NATO was an effective collective security body during the Cold War against the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO developed partnerships with Russia. Russia has inherited the imperial ideology of the Soviet Union and is constantly fanning military conflicts in order to seize more territory and establish control there. Russia's cooperation with NATO has not changed Russia's aggressive nature. Unlike Russia, Ukraine fully shares the values of the Euro-Atlantic community and actively cooperates with NATO with a view to gaining membership in the Alliance. To stop Ukraine on its path to Ukraine's membership in the EU and NATO, Russia has launched a military aggression against Ukraine. Institutional weakness has prevented NATO from preventing Russian aggression. Peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area will be established after NATO reform.

### KEYWORDS

Euro-Atlantic security system, NATO, military aggression, peace, security

## Introduction

The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century was marked by the intensification of military conflicts in the Eurasian region, which were largely determined by the imperial ambitions of the Russian Federation (Russia). The leadership of Russia is increasingly resorting to the use of military force in order to achieve foreign policy intentions. At the same time, the intensification of Russia's relations with the countries of the European Union and NATO continues. In this context, a contradictory situation arises when the world's largest military-political alliance actively interacts with the world's largest aggressor, which is Russia today. Although NATO periodically condemned the aggressive actions of the Russian leadership in relation to other countries, in particular: in Moldova, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Yugoslavia, South Ossetia, Georgia, and later in Syria – NATO's interaction with Russia continued until 2014, when Russian troops carried out an open military aggression against Ukraine and the NATO leadership finally recognized the insidious and aggressive nature of the policy of the Russian helmsmen under the leadership of the unprincipled Putin. And even after 24 February 2022, after the large-scale invasion of Russian troops on the territory of Ukraine, NATO is trying to avoid a military confrontation with the Russian invaders. In the conditions of military aggression, NATO no longer acts as a military-political union, but as a consultative and advisory body. The NATO leadership makes statements condemning the Kremlin's policy, conducts various consultations, meetings, and other various measures of informational and organizational influence on the world community in order to draw the world community's attention to the Russian-Ukrainian military confrontation. However, this behavior of NATO turned out to be ineffective, since NATO could not prevent the military invasion of Russia both in Ukraine and in other countries. An analysis of NATO's activities during military conflicts gives grounds for asserting that NATO's existing institutional capabilities are ineffective and not valid in stopping the aggressive expansionist actions of the Putin administration in particular. And as a result, military operations are already taking place near the borders with NATO countries.

The problem of studying NATO's role, in particular its institutional capabilities in the context of Russia's military aggression against other states, including in Ukraine, remains unsolved. The world press and research circles do not pay enough attention to the investigation of NATO's institutional

capabilities in preventing and curbing military aggression. NATO explains passivity in the settlement of military conflicts with the participation of Russia by efforts to avoid provoking the Russian leadership to increase military escalation. However, practice proves the exact opposite reaction of the Kremlin, which considers NATO's restrained position as a sign of its own strength and a reason to increase its use.

The author of the article set himself the goal of researching NATO's policy towards Russia in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, analyzing the effectiveness of NATO's measures in the context of the war, and based on the facts found, thus proving the weakness and inadequacy of NATO's institutional capabilities to prevent and stop Russia's military aggressions, which it often carries out in order to achieve imperial intentions.

The problems of NATO's institutional capabilities in the conditions of Russian military aggression against Ukraine were studied in separate parts and presented in the subsections of the article, in particular the following: historical preconditions for the creation of the Euro-Atlantic security system; imperial wars of Russia; NATO – Russia relations; Ukraine's relations with NATO; NATO and Russia's military aggression against Ukraine. This research structure made it possible to form an objective view of the state of NATO's institutional capabilities in the context of military conflicts and draw reasonable conclusions and offer appropriate recommendations, which, in the author's opinion, should contribute to the improvement of NATO's effectiveness and security in the Euro-Atlantic region.

The retrospective method, the historical method, the comparative method and the method of critical analysis were used as the methodological basis of the research. Such methodological tools allowed tracing the facts in their chronological order, on the basis of which the general concepts of the problem under study and generalization were formed. In particular, historical evidence of Russia's aggressive policy and its imperial essence was formulated. Based on a comparative and critical rethinking of the obtained concepts and generalizations, the relevant patterns were identified and conclusions were drawn. As a result, it was proved that Russia used cooperation with NATO to realize its imperial intentions. Ukraine, on the other hand, fully shares Euro-Atlantic values and focuses its foreign policy on integration with the EU and NATO. This methodological approach has identified weaknesses in NATO's institutional capacity and developed effective, in the author's view, recommendations for strengthening NATO's role in security and peace in the Euro-Atlantic area.

### 3.1. Historical Preconditions for the Creation of the Euro-Atlantic Security System

The formation of the Euro-Atlantic security system dates back to 1949, when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. The threat of post-war revanchism in Germany, and later the aggressive policy of the USSR, prompted European countries and the United States to seek a new architecture of Euro-Atlantic security<sup>217</sup>. The construction of the Iron Curtain, the coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, the blockade by the Soviet Union in the spring of the same year of the occupation zones of Berlin – all these actions required an adequate response<sup>218</sup>.

According to the Treaty, its participants unite their efforts to carry out collective defense and maintain peace and security in accordance with the UN Charter, which is fundamental in formulating the goals and objectives of the organization. The Contracting Parties declare that they reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and governments. The second goal was the determination of the parties to defend the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, based on the principles of democracy, individual freedom and the rule of law. The third goal of the Treaty is to unite efforts to create collective security and preserve peace. To this end, it has been established that an armed attack on one or more of them in Europe or North America will be considered an attack on all of them, and each member state must provide assistance to the party or parties affected, including the use of force<sup>219</sup>.

It is worth noting that NATO has not only fulfilled its statutory goal but has also expanded with new members and effectively become a guarantor of security not only in Europe and North America, but in fact around the world. The period in NATO's history of 1949–1991 was called the Cold War.

<sup>217</sup> Why was NATO founded?; <https://www.nato.int/weare nato/why-was-nato-founded.html>, [12.06.2022].

<sup>218</sup> What is NATO and Why was it created?; <https://www.dw.com/en/what-is-nato-and-why-was-it-created/a-60688639#:~:text=NATO%2C%20the%20North%20Atlantic%20Treaty%20Organization%2C%20was%20formed,Soviet%20expansion%20in%20Europe%20after%20World%20War%20II>, [12.06.2022].

<sup>219</sup> How did NATO survive the Cold War? NATO's transformation after the Cold War from 1989 to the present; [https://www.nato.int/cps/kz/natohq/opinions\\_20626.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/kz/natohq/opinions_20626.htm?selectedLocale=en), [12.06.2022].

a period of confrontation between the Western democracies and the authoritarianism of the Soviet Union, which sought to expand its influence by retaining the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and attracting new members to fight for liberation, state independence, to the so-called socialist camp. These were mainly so-called third world countries in Africa and Asia. However, this project failed, the socialist camp not only did not expand, but on the contrary collapsed with the Soviet Union. In this confrontation, NATO won, reaffirming the benefits of democracy and the rule of law over despotism and autocracy. It is worth noting that during the Cold War, NATO did not use military force to address pressing political issues<sup>220</sup>.

### 3.2. Imperial Wars of Russia

However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the problem of confrontation between the world of authoritarianism and the Western world of democracy has not disappeared. The Russian Federation (Russia), as the successor to the Soviet Union, not only inherited its legal rights, but also its ideology. Russia's leadership did not accept the loss of control over part of the territory, as the Soviet republics after the collapse of the Soviet empire became independent states and virtually came out of direct political control of Russia.

The Russian leadership has launched a new «campaign» to return the lost territories. The first victim of Moscow's imperial ambitions was Moldova, which was one of the first countries of the former Soviet Union to actively build statehood and become an independent democracy. In 1992, during the Transnistrian War, the Russian 14th Army on Transnistria sided with the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic, forcing Chisinau to retreat and achieve a truce. As a result, the conflict was frozen. The Transnistrian problem remains unresolved to date, and Russian troops remain in Transnistria<sup>221</sup>.

During the 1992–1993 Georgian–Abkhaz war, Russia sided with Abkhazia, supplying the Abkhaz side with weapons, ammunition, and training in combat operations. A ceasefire and disengagement agreement was

<sup>220</sup> *Moldova–Transdnier Conflict (1992 – Present)*; <https://www.ivoryresearch.com/samples/moldova-transdnier-conflict-1992-present>, [12.06.2022].

<sup>221</sup> *A Short Chronicle of Events of the 1992–93 Georgian–Abkhazian War*; <https://abkhazworld.com/aw/conflict/729-chronicle-1992-93-georgian-abkhazian-war>, [12.06.2022].

signed between Georgia and Abkhazia on 14 May 1994 with the mediation of Russia, and a CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force, fully staffed by Russian troops, has been stationed in the conflict zone since June 1994 about three thousand peacekeepers. In 2008, Russian troops illegally crossed the Russian-Georgian state border and advanced into the South Ossetian conflict zone, launching a full-scale ground, air and naval invasion of Georgia. As a result of the war, Russia occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia and recognized their «independence»<sup>222</sup>.

In 1994, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, which tried to exercise its constitutional right to secede from the USSR thanks to the 1990 Law on the Procedure for Resolving Issues Related to the Withdrawal of the Union Republic from the USSR. However, the Russian leadership did not agree with the choice of the Chechen people and started a war that lasted for 2 years. The conflict resulted in the victory of the Chechen armed forces and the withdrawal of Russian troops, mass destruction, casualties and the preservation of Chechnya's independence. Russian authorities did not agree with the independent status of Ichkeria and in 1999 launched a second war, which lasted until 2009. Although the Russian army suffered heavy losses, but the resistance of the Chechen armed forces was overthrown, and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was returned to Russia<sup>223</sup>.

In June 1999, a military conflict broke out in Kosovo's post-war Pristina International Airport between NATO forces and units of the Russian Armed Forces. Without warning, on the night of 12 June Russian troops occupied the airport and took control of it. The so-called Russian peacekeepers remained in Kosovo until 2003, when the Russian contingent was withdrawn from Kosovo. Under the pretext of protecting the Serbian population, Russia sought to establish its control in the Balkans and oppose NATO. In fact, Russia was forced to do so under pressure from NATO, fearing international isolation [8]<sup>224</sup>. In addition, Russia could find itself at war on two fronts: one inside Ichkeria and the other against NATO in Kosovo.

<sup>222</sup> *How the 1994 Battle of Grozny Changed Russia Forever*; <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-1994-battle-grozny-changed-russia-forever-127847>, [12.06.2022].

<sup>223</sup> *Russian troops leave KFOR*; <https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/07-july/e0702a.htm#:~:text=2%20July%202003%20Russian%20troops%20leave%20KFOR%20A,force%20in%20Kosovo%20after%20four%20years%20of%20service>, [12.06.2022].

<sup>224</sup> M. Martorell Yunyent, *Book Review: "Putin's War in Syria: Russian Foreign Policy and the Price of America's Absence" by Anna Borshchevska*; <https://manaramagazine.org/2021/10/11/book-review-putins-war-in-syria-russian-foreign-policy-and-the-price-of-americas-absence-by-anna-borshchevska>, [12.06.2022].



In September 2015, in violation of international law, Russia sent troops into Syria to support President Bashar al-Assad in his fight against the movement against the dictatorial regime of this country. Thanks to Russian intervention, Bashar Assad's regime was saved from his imminent defeat by the rebels. In this way, in the person of Bashar al-Assad, Russia gained a government loyal to Moscow, and thus the Kremlin was able to maintain its influence in the Middle East<sup>225</sup>.

In the eighth year of the military conflict between the Russia and Ukraine, which began in 2014 after the Russian occupation of Crimea and part of the eastern territories of Ukraine, 24 February 2022 escalated into a real war between the two countries, when Russian military aggression against Ukraine. If in 2008 Russia's leadership tried to hide its criminal activities in Ukraine, trying to prove that Russian troops are not in Ukraine, this time the Kremlin is no longer trying to hide the presence of its troops in Ukraine, and invents absurd reasons to justify its military aggression against Ukraine. Russia has deliberately entered into open confrontation with the whole world, hoping once again with the help of military force to establish military and political control in Ukraine<sup>226</sup>.

### 3.3. NATO – Russia Relations

After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO sought to build partnerships and continue dialogue with Russia. NATO – Russia relations officially began in 1991, when Russia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council – EAPC in 1997)<sup>227</sup>. This forum was set up to improve transparency and deepen dialogue with post-Cold War countries. In 1994, Russia began participating in the program Partnership for Peace<sup>228</sup>.

In May 1997, NATO leaders and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the NATO – Russia Founding Act, in which they expressed their strong

<sup>225</sup> J. Masters, *Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia*; <https://www.cfr.org/background/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia>, [12.06.2022].

<sup>226</sup> В. Ніконов, «Партнерство заради миру», Незалежна газета, 07 квітня 1994, р. 2.

<sup>227</sup> T. Marshall, *Russia Joins NATO Peace Partnership*, *Los Angeles Times*, 23 June 1994; <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-06-23-mn-7714-story.html>, [12.06.2022].

<sup>228</sup> Jan de Weydenthal, *NATO/Russia: Founding Act On Relations Signed In Paris*; <https://www.rferl.org/a/1084839.html>, [12.06.2022].

desire to «jointly build lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and security based on cooperation». The document declares the goal of cooperation in such areas as peacekeeping, arms control, the fight against terrorism and drugs, and missile defense of the theater of military operations (TMO)<sup>229</sup>. It was envisaged that this Basic Act would promote cooperation between NATO and Russia on the principles of human rights and civil liberties, non-use of force or threats of force against each other or against any other state. The parties also established a Permanent Joint Council (PJC) as a mechanism for bilateral consultations and dialogue between the parties in the field of security and defense. However, some prejudices that have persisted since the Cold War have prevented the full realization of the PJC's potential. NATO–Russia relations have also been affected by differences of opinion over NATO's air operation in Kosovo. As a result, the PJC meeting was suspended and relations between Russia and NATO were frozen<sup>230</sup>.

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Brussels and Moscow decided to resume relations, as the possibility of new terrorist acts threatened the stability of both sides. In Rome, on 28 May 2002, NATO and Russia adopted the Declaration on NATO – Russia Relations: A New Quality, which provided for the establishment of the Russia – NATO Council (NRC), which replaced the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and became a forum for security and cooperation. The Rome Declaration is based on the goals and principles of the NATO – Russia Fundamental Act of 1997 on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, which remains the official basis of NATO – Russia relations. Through the NATO – Russia Council, the parties sought to work together on counter-terrorism, crisis management, arms control and missile defense of TMO<sup>231</sup>.

NATO–Russia relations intensified between 2002 and 2008. In 2002, the parties held two high-level conferences (Rome and Moscow) on the role of the armed forces in the fight against terrorism. In 2003, NATO and Russia

<sup>229</sup> J. B. Steinberg, P. Gordon, *NATO Enlargement: Moving Forward; Expanding the Alliance and Completing Europe's Integration*; <https://www.brookings.edu/research/nato-enlargement-moving-forward-expanding-the-alliance-and-completing-europes-integration>, [12.06.2022].

<sup>230</sup> A.M. Sparano, *The NATO-Russia Council: Origins and Prospects*; [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235100817\\_The\\_NATO-Russia\\_Council\\_Origins\\_and\\_Prospects](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235100817_The_NATO-Russia_Council_Origins_and_Prospects), [12.06.2022].

<sup>231</sup> *NATO and Russia sign submarine rescue agreement*; <https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/02-february/e0208a.htm>, [12.06.2022].

signed an Agreement on the Rescue of Emergency Submarine Crews<sup>232</sup>. In 2004, the parties launched joint command and staff exercises of the NRC participants to work out the issues of MD and TMO<sup>233</sup> [17]. In 2005, the NRC Defense Ministers adopted the Political-Military Guidelines, aimed at gradually achieving interoperability between Russian and NATO units at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of government<sup>234</sup>. Russia's first frigate «Pytliviy» took part in NATO's Operation «Active Efforts» in the Mediterranean in 2006<sup>235</sup>. In 2007, NRC observers were invited to France for field exercises to test the response to a nuclear munition accident<sup>236</sup>.

However, in 2008 Russia brutally violated international law following the aggression against Georgia. Russia's aggressive actions have led to the suspension of official NATO – Russia Council meetings and cooperation in some areas. Despite calls from Allies for Russia to overturn its decision to recognize the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, Russia's leadership has not made any concessions. However, at the NATO summit in Strasbourg – Kelly on 4 April 2009, NATO leaders acknowledged differences with Russia over Georgia, but decided to resume practical and political cooperation<sup>237</sup>. During 2009–2010, the parties did not take active practical actions with the participation of the military, but dealt with the analysis of common security challenges in the XXI century, studied opportunities for the development of relations and cooperation.

In December 2011, the NRC foreign ministers met in Brussels to discuss international security and practical cooperation within the NRC, concerning Afghanistan, the fight against piracy and counter-terrorism. They approve the NRC Work Program for 2012 and announce an agreement on the

<sup>232</sup> W. Boese, *NATO, Russia Hold Joint Missile Defense Exercise*; <https://www.arm-scontrol.org/act/2004-04/press-releases/nato-russia-hold-joint-missile-defense-exercise>, [12.06.2022].

<sup>233</sup> *Meeting of the NATO-Russia Council at the level of Foreign Ministers held in Brussels on Thursday, 8 December 2005*; [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_21718.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_21718.htm?selectedLocale=en), [12.06.2022].

<sup>234</sup> *Russian frigate deployed in Operation Active Endeavour*; <https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2007/09-september/e0903a.html>, [12.06.2022].

<sup>235</sup> *NRC experts attend French nuclear weapons accident response exercise*; [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_7606.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_7606.htm), [12.06.2022].

<sup>236</sup> G. Kuczyński, *NATO–Russia Relations: The Return of the Enemy*; <https://warsawinstitute.org/nato-russia-relations-return-enemy>, [12.06.2022].

<sup>237</sup> *Statement by the Chairman of the NATO-Russia Council Anders Fogh Rasmussen following the NATO-Russia Council at Foreign Ministers level*; <https://www.nato.int/nrc-website/en/articles/2011-12-08-nrc-statement/index.html>, [12.06.2022].

sharing of operational readiness airspace<sup>238</sup>. In 2013, NRC defense ministers exchanged views on pressing issues on the international agenda, including Syria, transparency in military exercises, and discussed opportunities for enhanced practical cooperation, including plans to work together to dispose of surplus munitions in Russia, possibly with the help of the project of the new trust fund RRN<sup>239</sup>.

Following the illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea by Russia, NATO allies decided in 2014 to suspend all practical civil and military cooperation with Russia, leaving open political and military channels of communication<sup>240</sup>. In February 2022, the Allies adopted an unprecedented package of restrictive measures, including massive and severe economic sanctions imposed on Russia as a result of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine<sup>241</sup>. NATO members called on Russia to immediately cease its hostilities and withdraw all its forces from and around Ukraine, to fully respect international humanitarian law and to provide safe and unhindered humanitarian access and assistance to all those in need. They also call on Russia to stop restricting shipping in parts of the Black Sea and to block access to the Sea of Azov<sup>242</sup>.

### 3.4. Ukraine's Relations with NATO

Immediately after gaining independence, Ukraine, seeking to ensure national security, hesitantly chose the path of cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic security system. Immediately after gaining independence, Ukraine, seeking to ensure national security, hesitantly chose the path of cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic security system. Since 1991, Ukraine has joined the

<sup>238</sup> *Press conference by the NATO Secretary General and Chairman of the NATO-Russia Council, Anders Fogh Rasmussen*; [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions\\_104379.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_104379.htm), [12.06.2022].

<sup>239</sup> *Measures following NATO Ministers' decision to suspend all practical cooperation with Russia*; [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_108902.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_108902.htm), [12.06.2022].

<sup>240</sup> *Joint Statement on Further Restrictive Economic Measures*; <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/26/joint-statement-on-further-restrictive-economic-measures>, [12.06.2022].

<sup>241</sup> *NATO leaders call on Russia to stop "senseless war"*; [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_192451.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_192451.htm), [12.06.2022].

<sup>242</sup> В. Бурдяк, І. Мороз, *Перспективи співробітництва «Україна – НАТО» і роль у ньому польського фактора*, Україна і світ, 2008, no 8.

North Atlantic Cooperation Council and joined the program «Partnership for Peace» (PfP) in February 1994. This program laid the foundations for practical bilateral cooperation between Ukraine and NATO and was developed in accordance with the specific ambitions, needs and capabilities of Ukraine<sup>243</sup>. Beginning in 1995, Ukraine and NATO began to hold joint international exercises between Ukraine and NATO in the framework of the PfP «Peace Shield» peace exercise<sup>244</sup>. In the same year, Ukraine became a member of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA).

In December 1994, Ukraine acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear state, and the last warhead was exported to Russia in August 1996<sup>245</sup>. In support of this Act, Russia, together with the United States and the United Kingdom, provided security guarantees for Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum. China and France later joined the memorandum. Ukraine's renunciation of nuclear weapons has become an unprecedented phenomenon in world history, as for the first time in human history the country has voluntarily committed such an act. This aroused great respect for Ukraine on the part of the world community, and also contributed to the strengthening of Ukraine's cooperation with Euro-Atlantic structures.

Ukraine–Brussels relations have been further developed since the signing in 1997 of the NATO Charter at Madrid Summit on a Special Partnership, which is the official basis for NATO–Ukraine relations and on the basis of which the NATO – Ukraine Commission (NATO) for Cooperation was established<sup>246</sup>. The NATO Information and Documentation Center was opened in Ukraine in 1997 and the NATO Liaison Office in 1999<sup>247</sup>. In November 1998, Kyiv and Brussels signed the «Program of Ukraine's Cooperation with

<sup>243</sup> І. Поваляєв, *Авіаудар по Яворівському полігону: офіційно підтверджено загибель 35 Героїв*, Україна молода, 2008, no 13.

<sup>244</sup> *Ядерний статус України. Міф чи реальність?*, <https://rudenko.kiev.ua/blogs/yadernii-status-ukraini-mif-realnist>, [12.06.2022].

<sup>245</sup> *У Києві пройшла конференція на ознаменування 15-річчя Хартії про Особливе партнерство між Україною і НАТО*, [https://www.nato.int/cps/uk/natohq/news\\_89089.htm?selectedLocale=uk](https://www.nato.int/cps/uk/natohq/news_89089.htm?selectedLocale=uk), [12.06.2022].

<sup>246</sup> *Закінчення "холодної війни." Міжнародні відносини наприкінці ХХ – на початку ХХІ ст.*, [https://pidru4niki.com/1212110840968/istoriya/zakinchennya\\_holodnoyi\\_viyuni\\_mizhnarodni\\_vidnosini\\_naprikintsi\\_pochatku\\_xxi](https://pidru4niki.com/1212110840968/istoriya/zakinchennya_holodnoyi_viyuni_mizhnarodni_vidnosini_naprikintsi_pochatku_xxi), [12.06.2022].

<sup>247</sup> Кабінет Міністрів України ПОСТАНОВА від 29 листопада 1999 р. N 2181 Київ, *Про виконання Державної програми співробітництва України з Організацією Північно-Атлантичного Договору (НАТО) на період до 2001 року*, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2181-99-%D0%BF#Text>, [12.06.2022].

NATO for the Period up to 2001»<sup>248</sup>. In 1998, the «Peace Shield» exercise was attended by representatives of 18 countries, and in 2000 – about 1,600 servicemen from 26 countries<sup>249</sup>. In the same year, the NATO–Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defense Reform was established, which became the main body directing cooperation between Ukraine and NATO in the field of security and defense reform<sup>250</sup>. In 2000, the parties signed the «Status of Forces Agreement», which defined the status of their forces and what privileges, opportunities and immunities will apply to them when they are in the territory of another state that is a party to the Agreement<sup>251</sup>. In 2001, the training center of the International Center for Peacekeeping and Security was opened in Yavoriv. In October 2001, a NATO-sponsored seminar entitled «NATO–Ukraine Cooperation as an Important Aspect for Strengthening the European Security System» was held to discuss various aspects of NATO – Ukraine cooperation, such as emergency planning, peacekeeping operations and more global issues of European integration and Ukraine's contribution to European security. In November 2001, Ukrainian officials, representatives of international organizations, research institutes and former Italian and Polish officials took part in the conference «Ukraine's European Choice: Internal Transformations and the Search for a New Foreign Policy Role». Participants focused on Ukraine's economic, security and political European prospects: EU enlargement and Ukraine's integration into European markets, Ukraine's role in promoting European security, the role of parliament and civil society in democratization and institution building in Ukraine. Among the main practical mechanisms of cooperation are cooperation in the implementation of the NATO–Ukraine Military Committee Work Plan, implementation of the NATO – Ukraine Individual Partnership Program (IPP), participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in multinational exercises, cooperation in the NATO Air Situation Data Exchange Program (ASDE) and the NATO Military

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<sup>248</sup> Багатонаціональні командно-штабні комп'ютерні навчання «Щит миру – 2001» розпочалися на Яворівському полігоні Західного оперативного командування Сухопутних військ Збройних сил України; <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/877950.html>, [12.06.2022].

<sup>249</sup> Спільна робоча група Україна–НАТО з оборонної реформи; [http://www.nato.int/cps/uk/natolive/topics\\_50320.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/uk/natolive/topics_50320.htm), [12.06.2022].

<sup>250</sup> В. Горбулін, *Взаємовідносини Україна – НАТО в контексті євроатлантичних інтеграційних процесів*, Національна безпека і оборона, 2003, no 7.

<sup>251</sup> *Збройні сили України: курсом до НАТО*. Розповідає головнокомандувач Збройних Сил України, генерал армії Віктор Муженко; <https://hi-tech.ua/article/zbroyni-sili-ukrayini-kursom-do-nato>, [12.06.2022].

Education Improvement Program (DEEP), the implementation of projects under the NATO Trust Funds in Support of Ukraine (TF), cooperation with the NATO Joint Center for the Study and Generalization of Best Practices (JALIC), and the involvement of forces and means of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the NATO Response Force (NRF).

In order to intensify cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, as well as to acquire the necessary capabilities, several joint working groups were established on specific issues, including: on defense reform, on scientific and environmental cooperation, on defense and technical cooperation<sup>252</sup>.

Since 2007, Ukraine has been participating in the NATO Integrity Initiative (BI), which provides practical assistance and advice on strengthening integrity, accountability and transparency in the defense and security sector<sup>253</sup>. In October 2014, nine defense and security institutions in Ukraine completed a process of self-assessment and peer review of NATO's integrity, which provided a thorough assessment of institutional needs and vulnerabilities and offered a set of policy recommendations to improve good governance and sustainable anti-corruption reform in the defense sector and related security sectors. Based on this, the special program of activities continues to provide two levels of capacity building support – specific knowledge for institutions to improve good governance and management of defense resources (financial, human and material), and educational and training activities for individual capacity building and holistic organizational culture.

Since 2014, in response to the NATO–Ukraine conflict, several projects have been launched through the establishment of Trust Funds to support capacity development and sustainable capacity development in key areas: command, control, communications and computers (C4); logistical support and standardization, medical rehabilitation, military career transformation, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and anti-improvised explosive devices, and cybercrime<sup>254</sup>.

Since 2016, the Alliance has offered a comprehensive package of assistance to Ukraine to implement security and defense reforms in line with NATO standards, providing strategic-level advice through the NATO Office

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<sup>252</sup> NATO's Support to Ukraine; [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2018\\_11/20181106\\_1811-factsheet-nato-ukraine-support-eng.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_11/20181106_1811-factsheet-nato-ukraine-support-eng.pdf), [12.06.2022].

<sup>253</sup> Відносини з Україною; [https://www.nato.int/cps/uk/natohq/topics\\_37750.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/uk/natohq/topics_37750.htm), [12.06.2022].

<sup>254</sup> Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine; [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2016\\_09/20160920\\_160920-compreh-ass-package-ukraine-en.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_09/20160920_160920-compreh-ass-package-ukraine-en.pdf), [12.06.2022].

in Ukraine and support through 16 capacity development programs and trust funds. Cooperation in this area is crucial for the ongoing transformation of Ukraine's security position and remains an important part of its democratic transition<sup>255</sup>.

In June 2017, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a resolution recognizing NATO membership as a strategic task of foreign and security policy. The law stipulates that the main principles of foreign policy are to deepen cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance in order to gain membership in this organization<sup>256</sup>.

Russia's armed aggression has led to radical changes in Ukraine's external and internal security environment, necessitating new mechanisms to guarantee Ukraine's national security and a clear enshrinement in the Basic Law of the state of the irreversibility of Ukraine's civilizational choice, embodied in Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic integration. In 2019, the relevant amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine came into force. The purpose of the proposed amendments is to enshrine in the Constitution of Ukraine the choice of civilization, the European identity of the Ukrainian people and the irreversibility of the strategic course of the state to gain full membership in Ukraine in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization<sup>257</sup>. In September 2020, the President of Ukraine approved a new National Security Strategy of Ukraine, which provides for the development of Ukraine's original partnership with NATO for NATO membership.

The strategy states that in order to strengthen the special partnership with NATO and gain full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Ukraine plans to:

- achieve sufficient compatibility of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other components of the security and defense sector with the relevant structures of the Allies as soon as possible;
- substantially intensify the reforms that need to be implemented in order to meet the criteria for NATO membership in the framework of the

<sup>255</sup> Повний текст виступу Голови Верховної Ради України на прес-конференції; <https://www.rada.gov.ua/news/Povidomlennya/146584.html>, [12.06.2022].

<sup>256</sup> Сьогодні набули чинності зміни до Конституції щодо курсу України в ЄС і НАТО; <https://www.unian.ua/politics/10454259-sogodni-nabuli-chinnosti-zmini-do-konstituciji-shchodo-kursu-ukrajini-v-yes-i-nato.html>, [12.06.2022].

<sup>257</sup> Володимир Зеленський затвердив Стратегію національної безпеки України; <https://www.president.gov.ua/news/volodimir-zelenskij-zatverdiv-strategiyu-nacionalnoyi-bezpek-63577>, [12.06.2022].



implementation of annual national programs under the auspices of the NATO – Ukraine Commission;  
to obtain a NATO Membership Action Plan<sup>258</sup>.

On 12 June 2020, Ukraine was granted the status of a NATO partner with enhanced capabilities, which allows for closer military-industrial cooperation, employment of Ukrainians in the Alliance's structures and additional protection from it. The new status provides enhanced access to interoperability programs and exercises, as well as more active exchange of information, in particular on lessons learned<sup>259</sup>.

### 3.5. NATO and Russia's Military Aggression Against Ukraine

Despite NATO's efforts to curb Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine, on 24 February 2022 Russia launched a large-scale war against Ukraine, attacking in three directions at once: from the north, from the east and from the south<sup>260</sup>. The Kremlin planned to capture Kyiv in a short time and gradually occupy other territories of Ukraine<sup>261</sup>. However, the world community, especially the United States, the European Union and Britain, strongly condemned Russia's aggression and declared unconditional and large-scale support for Ukraine – military, financial, economic, humanitarian and informational. Russian aggression unites Western countries in their quest to stop the Russian occupiers and support Ukraine in its war of liberation<sup>262</sup>. Only after the open military aggression of the Russian army on the territory of Ukraine on 24 February 2022,

<sup>258</sup> Україна отримала статус партнера НАТО з розширеними можливостями; <https://bukinfo.com.ua/show/news?lid=122114>, [12.06.2022].

<sup>259</sup> Росія розпочала відкриту війну проти України; <https://ukragroconsult.com/news/rosiya-rozpochala-vidkrytu-vijnu-proty-ukrayiny>, [12.06.2022].

<sup>260</sup> Кремль завчасно планував тактику «спаленої землі» в Україні-Данілов; <https://leopolis.news/post/59875/kreml-zavchasno-planuvav-taktyku-spaleno-zemli-v-ukraini-danilov>, [12.06.2022].

<sup>261</sup> 'Dark day for Europe': World leaders condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine; <https://www.enbc.com/2022/02/24/leaders-of-us-uk-eu-and-canada-condemn-russian-invasion-on-ukraine.html>, [12.06.2022].

<sup>262</sup> How Russia's attack on Ukraine violates international law; <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/how-russias-attack-on-ukraine-violates-international-law>, [12.06.2022].

the Euro-Atlantic community realized the real intentions of the Russian leadership and that Russia is not a partner but an enemy that poses a great threat to Euro-Atlantic security. NATO has strongly condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which is completely unjustified and unprovoked. The world community has recognized that Russia's aggression against Ukraine is a brutal violation of international law and poses a serious threat to Euro-Atlantic security<sup>263</sup>.

Although the Euro-Atlantic community jointly condemned the actions of Russian politicians, there was no consensus in the community on how to influence Russia to stop Russian aggression against Ukraine, and what political commitments the Russian leadership must fulfil. A number of EU countries, including those with close ties to Russian energy companies and heavily dependent on Russian gas, have even opposed sanctions against Russia and its politicians, as well as an embargo on Russian energy supplies to the EU<sup>264</sup>. The active views of US President Joe Biden, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Polish President Andrzej Duda have led to a shared vision of Russia's military aggression against Ukraine, a joint platform to support Ukraine and a joint response plan.

Russia's aggression against Ukraine has become a serious test not only for Ukraine but also for the Euro-Atlantic community, as this aggression has revealed shortcomings in NATO's activities as a collective body whose main role is to ensure the freedom and security of member countries through political and military means. NATO upholds the common Alliance's values of democracy, individual freedom, the rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. In principle, NATO's mandate should ensure Euro-Atlantic values throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has become a serious test not only for Ukraine but also for the Euro-Atlantic community, as this aggression has revealed shortcomings in NATO's activities as a collective body whose main role is to ensure the freedom and security of member countries through political and military means. NATO upholds and upholds the Alliance's values of democracy, individual freedom, the rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. In principle, NATO's mandate should ensure Euro-Atlantic values throughout the Euro-Atlantic area<sup>265</sup>.

<sup>263</sup> *Europe's Strategic Dependence on Russian Energy*; <https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/europes-strategic-dependence-russian-energy>, [12.06.2022].

<sup>264</sup> *Euro-Atlantic Partnership*; [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_67979.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67979.htm), [12.06.2022].

<sup>265</sup> *NATO-Russia relations: the facts*; [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_111767.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_111767.htm), [22.04.2022].

Moreover, having a contractual relationship with Ukraine, NATO must take steps to ensure security for Ukraine as well. This situation does not necessarily involve the use of NATO military force against Russia to defend Ukraine. The peculiarity of NATO's responsibility to protect Ukraine from external aggression is also due to the fact that Ukraine, as the first country in the world to renounce nuclear weapons, and secondly, has already suffered aggression from Russia in 2014.

Of particular note is the fact that, since 1991, NATO has been building relations with Russia against the backdrop of Russia's growing imperial intentions. As mentioned earlier, since 1992, after Russia's aggression against Moldova, Moscow has only intensified its military operations abroad. At the same time, both the scale of cooperation and forms of cooperation expanded. Although NATO's leadership has periodically condemned Russia's aggressive actions against other countries, it has not actually affected NATO's engagement with Russia. Moreover, Russia's interaction with NATO provided Russia with access to NATO standards, and Russia also received information on the military management system, the state of combat training of NATO forces, and the types and models of military weapons and equipment. In today's world, Russia has enjoyed the full study of NATO's overall combat capability. Russia's aggressive actions against other countries have not stopped NATO's leadership from engaging with Russia. Moreover, budget defense spending in Russia has been growing year by year. Russia was re-equipping its troops, developing new weapons and practicing new forms of warfare. This suggests that Russia's cooperation with NATO has strengthened Russia's military capabilities. NATO's restrained stance has strengthened Russia's leadership's confidence in achieving its foreign policy goals through military force and a sense of impunity. Finally, in February 2022, Russia dared to take an unprecedented step, violating all norms of international law and agreements with NATO, and launched a large-scale aggression against Ukraine.

## Conclusions

An analysis of NATO's actions in the context of military aggression against Ukraine allows drawing some conclusions about the effectiveness of the existing Euro-Atlantic security system. Despite the fact that NATO is a well-developed system with significant resources and institutional diversification, it has failed to accurately assess in time the threats and challenges posed by

Russia. NATO was more concerned with bilateral relations between the parties, and did not pay enough attention to developments outside the alliance. In addition, Russia's aggression against Ukraine has revealed some differences among NATO countries over Euro-Atlantic security. The positions of the member states were not unanimous in resolving acute issues, which were related to the assessment of Russia's actions, support for Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions against Russia. Decisions about NATO's actions in the face of Russian aggression have often overshadowed national interests among NATO members. It is known that a significant number of European countries are significantly dependent on Russian energy, so when considering NATO's position on Russia's actions, some NATO countries proceeded from their own interests. The leaders of these countries believed that the imposed restrictions on Russian energy imports would negatively affect the economic situation in these countries, and thus worsen the lives of citizens. The fact that a full-scale war is raging in Ukraine, killing civilians, forcing millions to relocate, and destroying many homes and social facilities has not been fully taken into account.

Assessing NATO's actions in the face of Russia's military aggression, it can be concluded that NATO was in fact not ready to counter the aggressor, which until recently was considered a partner<sup>266</sup>. In the context of the crisis, NATO has proved incapable of repelling Russia's aggressive actions. Although the alliance's leadership generally condemned the actions of the Russian occupiers, the alliance itself decided not to take direct action because, according to the alliance's leaders, it could provoke Russia to take aggressive action against NATO itself. Therefore, most of Ukraine's real assistance did not come directly from NATO, but from individual Allies<sup>267</sup>. Some Western politicians, including British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, US President Joe Biden, and Polish President Andrzej Duda, have played a leading role in organizing anti-Russia's resistance. Thanks to their openness, activity and perseverance, the world understood the true intentions of the Russian invaders, which contributed to the consolidation of international structures to support Ukraine. The issue of providing heavy weapons has been difficult

<sup>266</sup> *Невійськова допомога НАТО Україні в умовах агресії Росії*; [http://www.ucipr.org.ua/ua/?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=82:nev-yskova-](http://www.ucipr.org.ua/ua/?option=com_content&view=article&id=82:nev-yskova-), [22.04.2022].

<sup>267</sup> *Дмитро Кулеба закликав дев'ять країн НАТО надати Україні більше зброї та підвищити санкційний тиск на РФ*; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/04/01/dmytro-kuleba-zaklykav-devyat-krayin-shidnogo-flangu-nato-nadaty-ukrayini-bilshe-zbroyi-ta-pidvyshhyty-sankcijnyj-tysk-na-rf>, [22.04.2022].

to resolve, as some NATO countries have again expressed concern that this will further provoke Russia to increase its use of military force and even take active action against individual NATO countries<sup>268</sup>. And this is proof that the institutional capacity of NATO, and ultimately of the entire Euro-Atlantic community, is weak.

Practice has shown that in the context of military action, NATO does not have an agreed plan of action to repel the aggressor. In this conflict, NATO has proved to be more of an advisory body than a military-political one. Most decisions to support Ukraine have been made by NATO's national governments, so decisions vary in depth, form of support, and therefore effectiveness. As a result, heavy offensive weapons from Western partners arrive in Ukraine with a delay that affects the outcome of combat operations<sup>269</sup>. Differences in technical standards for military weapons and equipment also emerged during the war. Although NATO is known to pay close attention to the compatibility of military weapons and equipment, this process is incomplete, which also complicates its use in combat.

The military aggression is not over yet, and many more victims will be brought as a result of the unresolved conditions of its completion. Although some politicians today are calling for a ceasefire and a peaceful settlement, these initiatives have only been declared rather than implemented.

As a result of NATO's institutional inability to detect threats of external invasion in a timely manner, as well as to effectively counter external aggression, the alliance's weakness has emerged. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has been a real test for NATO to test its ability to stop and counter military aggression. In conclusion, NATO's institutional capacity remains weak.

Today it can be argued that the Russian-Ukrainian war has become the greatest military tragedy in Europe since World War II<sup>270</sup>. It testified that the existing security system in Europe was imperfect because it had failed to detect and counter military threats in a timely manner. This is also evidence of a weak research base that is unable to conduct an objective and unbiased analysis of the processes and policies of potential aggressor countries. In the

<sup>268</sup> В результаті важке наступальне озброєння від західних партнерів надходить до України із запізненням, що впливає на результати бойових дій; <https://delo.ua/uk/politics/aktivnist-boiovix-dii-v-ukrayini-moze-piti-na-spad-pislya-22-cervnya-viiskovii-ekspert-399558>, [22.04.2022].

<sup>269</sup> War in Europe: Responding to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine; <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/war-europe-responding-russia-s-invasion-ukraine>, [22.04.2022].

<sup>270</sup> Nearly 5 million jobs lost in Ukraine since the start of the war; <https://www.npr.org/2022/05/12/1098519669/ukraine-jobs-lost-5-million>, [22.04.2022].

context of military conflict, NATO members do not act as a single body based on common values, which should consolidate the positions and efforts of member countries in the context of external military aggression, but as separate groups of countries united by common values, and internal, national interests. As a result, there is a need for mediation by individual politicians in order to maintain unity and take consolidated decisions.

Although some NATO members have tried to withdraw from the conflict, they have been able to avoid it. The influx of 5 million migrants from Ukraine to Europe has increased pressure on the EU economy<sup>271</sup>. The need to provide more or less decent conditions for refugees has led to social tensions in the EU. The sanctions and growing demand for food have led to rising energy and food prices, and hence inflation. The threat of nuclear catastrophe on the European continent has increased due to the seizure and improper maintenance of nuclear power plants by Russian militants [56]. And this is an incomplete list of the negative consequences that have arisen as a result of Russia's military aggression against Ukraine.

An objective question arises – was it possible to prevent the Russian military invasion of Ukraine and thus prevent the largest humanitarian catastrophe in Europe since World War II? The question is complex and also requires some argumentation. To answer this question, it is appropriate to consider the conceptual framework of NATO's defense policy. The study was based on the Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of NATO Members (hereinafter the Strategy), adopted by the Heads of State and Government in Lisbon on 19 November 2010.

Paragraph 7 of the Strategy's Security Situation states, that peace has been established in the Euro-Atlantic area, although in fact the Russian-Georgian conflict has not yet been finally resolved. The main threats to NATO's security are terrorism, extremism, interstate illegal activities such as trade of arms and drugs, human trafficking, and cyber-attacks. Such type of security threat is not even considered a direct invasion of another state, although in 2008 Russian troops invaded Georgia in violation of international agreements and law, and as a result of this aggression, Georgia lost part of its territory.

Paragraph 20 of the Strategy states that crises and conflicts outside NATO's borders may pose a direct threat to the security of the Alliance's territory and population and that NATO will address them whenever possible

<sup>271</sup> *Ukraine: As war rages what are the risks at the Chernobyl nuclear plant?;* <https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-as-war-rages-what-are-the-risks-at-the-chernobyl-nuclear-plant/a-61071864>, [22.04.2022].

and as necessary to prevent crises, resolve crises, stabilize post-conflict situations, as well as provide reconstruction assistance. In the conditions of Russian-Ukrainian aggression, this provision of the Strategy was not fully implemented.

Paragraph 22 of the Strategy provides for continuous monitoring and analysis of the international situation in order to counter crises and, if necessary, take active measures to prevent them from turning into major conflicts. Unfortunately, NATO has not taken active measures to prevent the transformation of the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which began in 2014, into a full-scale military aggression in 2022.

The strategy also stipulates that if the conflict prevention policy fails, NATO will be ready and able to resolve it. To this end, NATO has unique potential and capabilities for conflict resolution, including the unprecedented ability to deploy and use a powerful force. NATO-led operations, particularly in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, have demonstrated the Alliance's indispensable contribution to international conflict resolution efforts.

An analysis of the presented Strategy, as a fundamental document of NATO's activity, gives grounds to conclude that this document is to some extent obsolete and does not meet the requirements of today. This is confirmed by the fact that the document does not fully identify security threats in the Euro-Atlantic area. In particular, Russia's aggression against Ukraine is not directly under threat, but only indirectly. Analysis of the presented Strategy as a fundamental document does not mean that NATO does not react to Russia's aggression, but the leadership of the alliance does not use active actions, except condemnation, or only in a limited format. It should be noted that NATO does not leave Ukraine alone with the Russian aggressor; support from NATO comes mainly in the form of humanitarian, technical, expert assistance and other non-military assistance. However, NATO is refraining from providing military assistance to Ukraine, unlike in Afghanistan and the Balkans. Comparing the military conflicts in the Balkans and Afghanistan with the military conflict in Ukraine, it is clear that the war in Ukraine on the scale of hostilities, the number of human and military resources involved is much larger and more catastrophic than the Balkan and Afghan wars. However, NATO's leadership in decision-making is not based on the reality of military events caused by Russian aggression, but on the threat of NATO's open military confrontation with Russia.

Today, Ukraine receives strong financial and military support from Western countries, and this is a key factor in the ability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) to withstand the enemy. However, this support is provided

mainly through the leadership of individual countries, primarily the United States, Britain and Poland. Thanks to the activities of the leaders of these countries, including US President Joe Biden, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Polish President Andrzej Duda, it was possible to form a political consensus and public sympathy in Europe to support Ukraine in its liberation war against Russia. Thus, at the initiative of US President Joe Biden, on 26 April 2022, Defense Ministers and senior generals from both NATO and non-NATO members at Rammstein Air Force Base participated in a meeting aimed at synchronizing and accelerating the provision of military weapons to Ukraine to counter Russia's full-scale invasion and discussion of support for Ukraine after the war. A new pro-Ukrainian coalition was formed at the Rammstein meeting: 40 countries agreed to coordinate military aid to Kyiv to repel Russian aggression. The meeting on April 22 in Rammstein was of historical significance, as the meeting formed a consolidated vision of the 40 most influential countries in the world to support Ukraine, which lays the foundation for Ukraine's victory. However, it should be acknowledged that such a mechanism of support for Ukraine is quite lasting, as the process of harmonizing the positions of each individual country takes time, which is very expensive in times of war. Most member states of the anti-Russian coalition have begun supplying weapons to Ukraine, which is already being used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the battlefield against the Russian army. Of course, the support of Ukraine's foreign countries is crucial today, but it is not based on NATO's institutional capacity as an organization to ensure peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area, but on the initiative and compassion of Ukraine's partner countries. If NATO had a clear mandate to directly repel armed aggression that threatens security and peace in the Euro-Atlantic area, it is clear that Ukraine's assistance would be stronger and faster. The mere fact of NATO's military involvement in a military conflict would be a deterrent to Russia's military invasion of another country.

An analysis of NATO's activities suggests that there is an urgent need to substantially rethink NATO's institutional capacity to counter military threats and military aggression in the Euro-Atlantic area. The existing doctrinal base of the alliance no longer meets the requirements of today, and therefore is a deterrent to the development of the institutional capacity of the alliance and does not allow to fully realizing the economic, military and even political potential. Feelings of danger and even possible aggression are acutely felt even by some NATO members, especially in Eastern and Northern Europe. In the face of today's challenges, without NATO's active involvement, it is difficult to count on peace and security in Europe. At the same



time, NATO is constantly demonstrating its readiness to address complex security issues and is taking many steps, but practice has shown that this is not enough. The desire of European countries to coexist peacefully, to develop together and to build the future together is natural and inalienable, as well as to jointly counter security threats and military aggression. European security cannot be achieved only within the borders of NATO members, it must cover the whole of Europe, regardless of the country's membership in the alliance. Therefore, NATO's concept and strategy must be based on security for the whole of Europe and even the Euro-Atlantic area. The sooner NATO launches a renewal based on a new vision of Europe's security, the sooner peace and security in Europe will restore.

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